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ABSTRACT 
 The rise in judicialization research recognizes the influence of politics on the 
judicial branch. Judicialization is the acceptance and trial of traditional political 
quandaries by national courts that result in landmark cases and leads to the creation of 
new legislation. A rise in the number of landmark cases signals a fundamental alteration 
and understanding of the power and purpose of the judiciary. This thesis substantiates the 
claims of rising contentious political issues reaching national courts for adjudication. It 
addresses the causes for judicial empowerment via constitutionalization and determines 
the effects judicialization has on the process of democratization in Latin America using 
Brazil and Uruguay as case studies. 
v 
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Judicialization of politics is a global trend1 that identifies a rising importance of 
court determinations in the policy-making2 of modern democracies.3 Judicialization 
involves topics typically addressed outside the judicial branch, most commonly in the 
executive and legislative branches. Since national courts produce permanent legal 
precedents that affect the demos as a whole, a rise in cases signals, according to some 
scholars, a fundamental alteration and understanding of the power and purpose of the 
judiciary. Research in the field of judicialization predominantly centers on the United 
States4 with a few case studies available on other regions and in more than one country.5 
Examining location, causes, and consequences of judicialization, I attempt to contribute 
to the current body of knowledge in hope of bringing further understanding to a topic 
growing in importance and popularity.6 
                                                 
1 John A. Ferejohn, “Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 65, 
no. 3 (June 22, 2002): 41.  
2 Ferejohn, 41. 
3 Torbjörn Vallinder’s definition of judicialization is two-fold. “(1) the expansion of the province of 
the courts of the judges at the expense of the politicians and/or the administrators, that is the transfer of 
decision-making rights from the legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts or, at least (2) the 
spread of judicial decision-making methods outside the judicial province proper.” Torbjörn Vallinder, 
“When the Courts Go Marching In,” in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, ed. Chester Neal Tate and 
Torbjörn Vallinder (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 15; Ran Hirschl, “The Judicialization 
of Politics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. Robert E. Goodin (New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2013), 256, http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-013?print=pdf.  
4 Michael C. Munger, “Comment on Ferejohn’s ‘Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law,’” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 65, no. 3 (2002): 87–93, https://doi.org/10.2307/1192404.  
5 Diana Kapiszewski and Matthew M. Taylor, “Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in 
Latin America,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 4 (December 2008): 742, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1537592708081899. 




My thesis explores constitutionalization7 in the United States as a starting point, 
followed by case studies into judicial review cases of two Latin American countries, 
Brazil and Uruguay, in order to determine the effects of judicialization on consolidating 
democracies.8 This research is of particular concern for policymakers and political and 
judicial actors of democratic and/or democratizing countries because it identifies how the 
judicial branch currently offsets executive and congressional power.9 A deeper 
understanding of core changes in the political environments of Brazil and Uruguay could 
provide insight into the overall organization and strength of consolidated democracies 
facing highly politicized executive and legislative branches. Furthermore, the study of 
court outcomes may identify a more accurate standing of advancement or decline of 
democratic norms in the region. 
B. DEFINING JUDICIALIZATION 
Diana Kapiszewski and Matthew Taylor contend that the study of judicial politics 
involves significant variations of analytical approaches to judicialization, as well 
differences in the definition of the term itself.10 John Ferejohn defines judicialization as a 
“shift in power away from legislatures and towards courts and other legal institutions.”11 
Ran Hirschl expands the definition of “reliance on courts and judicial means for 
addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies” 
by including “mega-politics” or “matters of outright and utmost political significance that 
often define and divide whole polities.”12 For Hirschl, judicialization of politics entails 
                                                 
7 Girardeau A. Spann defines constitutionalization as “the process by which political preferences 
acquire constitutional stature that is of greater concern.” Girardeau A. Spann, “Constitutionalization,” Saint 
Louis University Law Journal 49 (April 2005): 710. 
8 The study of judicialization requires that a set of laws be available for research. In many countries, 
including those to be studied in this thesis, supreme rule is outlined in a nation’s constitution; therefore, 
judicialization in the context of Latin America involves constitutionalization. 
9 Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden, and Alan Angell, The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), loc. 196 of 6123, Kindle. 
10 Kapiszewski and Taylor, “Doing Courts Justice?,” 742. 
11 Ferejohn, “Judicializing Politics,” 41. 
12 Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Politics,” 257. 
 
 3 
“the transfer to courts of contentious issues of an outright political nature and 
significance.”13 Åsa Casula Vifell and Ebba Sjögren argue that the expansion of power of 
the judiciary is completed via structural and cognitive dimensions14 and limit their 
definition on “the influence of legal norms … beyond the formal remit of the 
judiciary.”15 Duncan McCargo presents two definitions, one positive and one negative. 
The first identifies a judiciary that contends with social and political matters in the name 
of “progressive activism and constructive engagement,” while the other, is used to 
describe the tool used to “curtail the power and influence of elected politicians.”16 
Beyond the term itself, experts offer a notion of time that conveys the 
transformation of judicial procedures. Experts claim that “judicialization of politics is 
advancing” and use statements to indicate that a global “profound shift,” “ever-
accelerating transformation,” or “worldwide tendency towards judicialization”17 has 
occurred, yet Diana Kapiszewski and Matthew Taylor say that current empirical evidence 
is uncoordinated and limited.18 
C. A NEW DEFINITION 
Empirical proof for judicialization relies on the study of the judicial branch as an 
institution19 and the legal processes outlined in each country’s constitution. Due to the 
broadness of the term, I am forced to scale down the definition of judicialization into a 
                                                 
13 Hirschl, 254. 
14 Åsa Casula Vifell, and Ebba Sjögren, “The Legal Mind of the Internal Market: A Governmentality 
Perspective on the Judicialization of Monitoring Practices,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 3 
(May 2014): 464–465.  
15 Vifell and Sjögren, 463. 
16 Duncan McCargo, “Competing Notions of Judicialization in Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 36, no. 3 (2014): 418, http://muse.jhu.edu/
journals/contemporary_southeast_asia_a_journal_of_international_and_strategic_affairs/v036/
36.3.mccargo.html. 
17 Armen Mazmanyan, “Judicialization of Politics: The Post-Soviet Way,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 13, no. 1 (January 2015): 200. 
18 Kapiszewski and Taylor, “Doing Courts Justice?,”742. 
19 New Institutionalism can be defined as “approaches … [that] seek to elucidate the role that 
institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes.” Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. 
Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies xliv, no. 5 (December 
1996): 936, Proquest.  
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more specific, manageable sphere via the inclusion of the concept of justiciability. The 
justiciability doctrine in regards to a political question, serves as a litmus test that gauges 
the limits of the court in addressing cases.20 If the court identifies a case as political in 
nature, then it labels it as “nonjusticiable,” which is grounds for rejection.21 According to 
Torbjörn Vallinder, judicialization occurs when courts go beyond their judiciary role by 
deciding cases based not on the “the best correct,” but “the best politically possible 
solution.”22 The judicial branch’s duty is to “say what the law is,”23 that is why a process 
that routinely accepts judicial review cases of “core moral predicaments”24 outside 
traditional limits set in the constitution elevates federal courts from interpreters of laws to 
political institutions primed for their development and legitimization. 
For the purpose of this thesis, “judicialization” is defined as the acceptance and 
trial of traditional political quandaries by a country’s national court, which result in 
landmark cases, and leads to the creation of new legislation. Historical research of 
constitutional democracies in North and South America ensures that case studies remain 
in the national sphere, and exclude international or transnational law and judicial 
proceedings. Judicial data from gathered from official sources will span a twenty-year 
period (1999–2017).25 Since identifying landmark cases is subjective, the final overall 
                                                 
20 “Political Question Doctrine,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, accessed May 1, 
2018, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/political_question_doctrine. “It is important to distinguish the 
political question doctrine from cases presenting political issues. Courts adjudicate controversies with 
political ramifications on a regular basis.” The “political question doctrine applies to issues that courts 
determine are best resolved within the politically accountable branches of government‒Congress or the 
executive branch,” however this determination is challenging. Jared P. Cole, The Political Question 
Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of Powers, CRS Report No. R43834 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2014), 2. 
21 “Justiciability,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, June 5, 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/justiciability.  
22 Torbjörn Vallinder, “The Judicialization of Politics—A World-wide Phenomenon: Introduction,” 
International Political Science Review 15, no. 2 (April 1994): 92. 
23 “Marbury v. Madison,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, accessed May 1, 2018, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/5/137.  
24 Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Politics,” 1. 
25 I selected this timeframe to answer the question posed by Ran Hirschl: Are courts today 
significantly more involved in dealing with core political predicaments than they were, say, a generation 
ago? Ran Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts,” Annual Review 
of Political Science 11 (June 2008): 113, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.183906. 
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determination will derive from the Latin American country itself, as stated in official 
communiqués, media, or scholarly works.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main body of literature combines available research from judicialization 
experts, who are mainly legal scholars, with the work on democratic consolidation by 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, which indicates how court determinations affect the five 
arenas that characterize consolidated democracies.26 
With regard to the rule of law, according to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, a democratic governmental system that includes checks and balances, 
constitutional judicial review, and “living” rules27 protects the demos from overreaching 
the very institutions that guarantee citizens’ supreme power. Chief Justice John Marshall 
highlighted that democracies place the rule of law as a “fundamental principle of 
society”28 that allows for “a balance between society’s need for order and the 
individual’s right to freedom.”29 Likewise, David Strauss argues that a flexible and 
provisional constitution relies on the judicial branch to determine if new laws fall within 
its scope, effectively establishing or denying norms according to its needs.30 In the same 
vein, Martin Shapiro and Alec S. Sweet, stress that the rule of law is the “norm that the 
government must govern by actions in accord with existing law until it chooses to change 
that law.”31 “[T]hroughout Latin America, perceptions of corruption are strongly and 
negatively related to regime legitimacy” because corruption “distorts the criteria by 
                                                 
26 Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
loc. 550 of 14177, Kindle. 
27 “The Court and Constitutional Interpretation,” Supreme Court of the United States, accessed May 1, 
2018, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx.  
28 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/
usrep005/usrep005137/usrep005137.pdf. 
29 Supreme Court of the United States, “The Court and Constitutional Interpretation.”  
30 David Strauss, “The Living Constitution,” The University of Chicago the Law School, last modified 
September 27, 2010, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution. 
31 Martin Shapiro and Alec S. Sweet, On Law Politics and Judicialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 166–167. 
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which public policies are chosen and thereby undermines the efficiency, efficacy, and 
public-regardingness of these policies.”32 In order for strengthen trust between citizens 
and government, measures of accountability must be effective and fair. In democracies, 
“all significant actors—especially the democratic government and the state apparatus—
must be held accountable to, and become habituated to, the rule of law.”33 The 
survivability of this system of governance rests on the premise that each branch‒
executive, legislative, and judicial, have specific functions that limit their reach and 
power. As such, in the view of the U.S. Senate, each branch operates within boundaries 
that also curb the encroachment of others in order to protect the “interests of majority rule 
and minority rights, of liberty and equality, and of the federal and state governments.”34  
Leslie Friedman Goldstein notes that the concept of judicial review has roots in 
colonial British-American legal procedures that continue to influence how constitutional 
democracies empower judicial branches throughout the globe.35 The author further 
stresses that judicial review is a checking and balancing mechanism used to assess 
executive orders and legislative laws based on their constitutional standing; while this 
“check” ensures that laws are subordinate to the interpretation of each country’s 
constitution.36 Additionally, adoption for judicial review rests on the notion that the “rule 
of law is preferable to the unchecked rule of individual will,” while rejection stems from 
lack of authority of non-elected judges versus elected representatives.37 There is no 
                                                 
32 “Presidentialism, federalism, and proportional representation electoral systems are associated with 
greater levels of perceived corruption. Brazil is one of four countries to possess all three of these 
institutional characteristics. Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor, “Introduction,” in Corruption and 
Democracy in Brazil, ed. Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame, 2011), 4, 32.  
33 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 
2 (April 1996): 19, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.2linz.html.  
34 “Constitution Day,” United States Senate, accessed May 1, 2018, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/generic/ConstitutionDay.htm.  
35 Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “Judicial Review,” in International Encyclopedia of Political Science, 
ed. Bertrand BadieDirk Berg-Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 
Inc., 2011), 1374–1376, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412959636.n313. 
36 Goldstein, 1374–1376. 
37 Goldstein, 1374. 
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consensus at this time to determine if judicial empowerment in democratic countries 
translates to overreach and ultimately leads to positive or negative outcomes. 
In the same context, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, note that a functioning 
democratic state must “exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of force” through a usable bureaucracy.38 A democracy must have the ability “to 
command, regulate, and extract” to protect citizen’s rights and it must do so via a usable 
state bureaucracy.39 Malcolm Langford maintains that judicial review determinations 
forge usable bureaucracy for the state apparatus by “building social trust via regime 
legitimation, accountability for commitments, and the deliberative potential of 
constitutional orders.”40 Consequently, any trace of political influence over national 
courts has direct consequences on the democratic standing of the government.41 
To clarify, the act of judicializing is in and of itself innocuous as it provides the 
raison d’être of a national court system in constitutional democracies with judicial review 
processes.42 However, national courts conducting judicial review of executive and/or 
legislative branch actions are limited to producing a determination of constitutionality.43 
The strict adherence to this boundary is impossible when confronted with the reality of 
landmark or policy-making trends.44  
Regarding civil society,45 Philipe Schmitter and Terri Karl note that democratic 
freedoms allow democratic societies to determine common needs through procedural 
                                                 
38 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 484. 
39 Linz and Stepan, loc. 474.  
40 Malcolm Langford, “Why Judicial Review?,” Oslo Law Review 2, no. 1 (2015): 85, 
https://www.idunn.no/oslo_law_review/2015/01/why_judicial_review.  
41 Pilar Domingo, “Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? Recent Trends in Latin 
America,” Democratization 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2004): 111, https://doi.org/10.1080/
1351034041233129152. 
42 Strauss, “The Living Constitution.” 
43 Vallinder, “The Judicialization of Politics,” 92. 
44 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1. 
45 Civil society is an “arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, 
relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and 
advance their interests.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 413.  
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norms, without the use of a coercive central authority, which encourages the creation of 
laws to serve the general, will of the people.46 However, these same authors also warn 
that “[a]ny polity that fails to impose such restrictions [procedural norms] upon itself, that 
fails to follow the “rule of law” with regard to its own procedures, should not be 
considered democratic” meaning that judicialization of politics affects the overall 
governmental structure of a country, questioning its commitment to core democratic 
norms.47 A consolidated democracy focuses on safeguarding the ability for civil society 
to thrive.48  
Arie M. Kacowicz and David R. Mares argue that governments “developed a 
distinctive juridical tradition of embedded principles of national sovereignty,”49 which is 
inherent in each American constitution. “[A] democratic polity must entail serious 
thought and action concerning the development of a normatively positive appreciation of 
those core institutions of a democratic political society–political parties, elections, 
electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures–by which society 
constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic governance.”50 
Furthermore, institutional routinization, like compulsory voting and the habituation of 
procedures for conflict regulation are the main components of consolidated 
democracies.51 A political society is responsible for the structure to challenge the 
legitimacy and power of the state.52 The political society “must somehow achieve a 
workable agreement on the myriad in which democratic power will be crafted and 
exercised.”53 According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, a political society54 is 
                                                 
46 Philippe Schmitter and Terri Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, 
no. 3 (1991): 7–8, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v002/2.3schmitter.pdf. 
47 Schmitter and Karl, “7–8. 
48 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 462. 
49 Arie M. Kacowicz and David R. Mares, “Security Studies and Security in Latin America in 
Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security, ed. Arie M. Kacowicz and David R. Mares (London: 
Routledge, 2016), 16. 
50 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 438. 
51 Linz and Stepan, loc. 462. 
52 Linz and Stepan, loc. 427. 
53 Linz and Stepan, loc. 462. 
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supported and “maintained by [an] impartial state apparatus,”55 yet this notion is 
challenged by Martin Shapiro who argues that the judicial branch is not free from 
political influence, because it is a political organization.56 
Lastly, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan define economic society as “socio-politically 
crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and regulations … that 
mediates between state and market.”57 Martin Shapiro affirms that “judges redistribute 
values and resources with their decisions, and thereby create categories of winners and 
losers within society.”58 The idea is that politicized courts have the power to assign 
victories or failures that will be accepted by the polity, based on “social policy … that 
cannot depend on neutral principles.”59 Furthermore, the court “is asked to perform the 
same tasks that every other political decision-maker is asked to perform and to do so as a 
complementary and supplementary segment of the whole complex of American political 
institutions.”60 Ferejohn agrees that the problem stems out of judicial empowerment and 
calls for reform of the judicial branch to prevent politicizing the courts. He claims that 
requiring a supermajority to appoint judges and limiting the number of terms served, will 
yield a “different” decision-making culture.61 Pilar Domingo has a more acquiescent 
view of the topic, noting that judicialization is an irreversible trait of democracies.62  
E. FRAMEWORK 
I first borrow from Ran Hirschl’s categorization of judicial empowerment theories to 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 Political society is an “arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate 
right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 433. 
55 Linz and Stepan, loc. 550. 
56 Shapiro and Sweet, On Law Politics and Judicialization, 22–23.  
57 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 497. 
58 Shapiro and Sweet, On Law Politics and Judicialization, 293. 
59 Shapiro and Sweet, 25. 
60 Shapiro and Sweet, 25. 
61 Ferejohn “Judicializing Politics,” 67. 
62 Domingo, “Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary?,” 111. 
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cluster research approaches,63 and proceed to analyze the impact of judicialization on 
consolidating democracies using Linz and Stepans’ five arenas.64 I will analyze the 
constitutions of Brazil and Uruguay to address my research question. However, it is 
imperative that this study corroborates or negates the widespread idea of judicialization 
prior to using it as a concept for case studies. Additionally, any research that focuses on 
non-U.S.-centric studies, will avoid what Ran Hirschl calls “traditional American 
parochialism.”65 Selection of Brazil and Uruguay as case studies is dependent on 
constitutionality standing, as well as consideration as a consolidated democracy. The 
reason for such strict and narrow specifications is to ensure a parallel exists among 
various dissimilar variables. Table 1 is an illustration of this framework. In Table 1, an 
assessment of high, medium, low or absent, will signal if effects in the democratic arenas 
of case studies correlate with particular constitutionalization theories. 
Table 1. Theoretical Framework 
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Arenas of a Consolidated Democracy 















    
Evolutionist     
Systemic, Needs 
Based 
    
Microlevel, 
Rational Choice 
    
Hegemonic 
Preservation 
    
 
Assessment values are based on the 2018 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation 
Index (BTI), in particular, civil society participation, political and social integration, rule 
of law, and governmental steering capacity, while also taking into account the definitions 
                                                 
63 These theories will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-
Politics and the Rise of Political Courts,” 95–97.  
64 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 550.  
65 Traditional American parochialism is the notion that an issue is best understood using a U.S.-centric 
model. This shortsighted approach ignores the lessons that can be learned when other scenarios outside the 
United States are considered Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through 
“Constitutionalization Revolution: Lessons from Israel’s Constitutional Revolution,” Comparative Politics 
33, no. 3 (2001): 93.  
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presented in Linz and Stepan’s work regarding the arenas of democratic consolidation. A 
low marking constitutes an assessment on a scale from 0 to 3. A medium assessment is 
identified with values from 4 to 6. The remaining values, 7 to 10, correspond to a high 
marking.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introduction covers the definition 
of judicialization. To produce a modicum of empirical data regarding a judicialization 
trend, I scope a new definition of judicialization from a generalized idea, to a more 
specific notion of the legal process. Vague definitions are discarded or incorporated into a 
clearer concept to address confusion in the political science field. This section also 
discusses the development of constitutional rule in the Americas and demonstrates the 
relationship between a constitution and judicialization. At the core of the second chapter, 
is the exploration of Latin American constitutions and constitutionalism. The historical 
background of constitutionalism aims to clarify how judicial powers differ by country. 
Additionally, an in-depth view of judicial review functions determines how federal courts 
exercise constitutional powers. The third and fourth chapters address statistics on 
constitutional judicial review cases that determine, if in fact, judicialization of this type 
has developed and risen over time in Brazil and Uruguay. As findings of increased 
judicialization are true in both countries, each chapter is organized to compare its effects 
on five major arenas of consolidated democracies: civil society, political society, rule of 
law, state apparatus, and economic society.66 Based upon my findings, I prove or deny 
the existence of judicialization in Latin America and gather recommendations for 
democratic and/or democratizing countries.  
G. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis I: I hypothesize that judicialization is a growing trend among 
American consolidated democracies due to constitutionalization in the region. The 
continuous use of national courts in Brazil and Uruguay address contentious issues that 
                                                 
66 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 550. 
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have a positive effect on civil society, political society, and rule of law, the core 
requirements of a consolidated democracy.67 The expansion of judicial power signals 
positive state growth.68  
Hypothesis II: Judicialization in Brazil and Uruguay yields varying degrees of 
judicial empowerment that does not support the progression of democracy. 
Judicialization usurps the power of executive and legislative power and leads to 
weakened institutions. Increased judicialization could lead to a debilitated civil society, 
political society, and rule of law. A higher number of judicial review cases could signify 
dodging of essential state duties, a negative quality of judicial power.69 
                                                 
67 Linz and Stepan, loc. 476. 
68 Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell, The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, loc. 6057. 
69 Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell, loc. 6057. 
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II. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
In this chapter, I discuss the source of power and the structure in which 
organizations use said power to establish governmental behavior. Furthermore, I explore the 
various features of American organizations that allow for differences in constitutional 
norms. In particular, I explain how the legacies of legal systems, evolution of constitutions, 
influence of judicial power, and outlook of key judicial actors affect the constitutional 
identity of a society via constitutional norms, and continue to shape the creation of new 
norms. Lastly, I review five theories that explain the causes for empowered national courts.  
To understand the phenomenon of judicialization, it is critical to first understand 
basic concepts of the nature of power and how it harnessed by a democratic government. 
Power derives from three sources: personality, property, and organization and can be 
exercised via condign, compensatory, or conditioned methods.70 A person, or the leadership 
qualities he or she embodies, can exercise condign and conditioned power. The former 
instrument of power relies on a person’s strength and physicality, and the latter “is the 
product of a continuum from objective, visible persuasion to what the individual in the 
social context has been brought to believe is inherently correct.”71 Wealth or income, 
identified here as property, exercises only compensatory power because it can punish 
disobedience and reward compliance.  
“[T]he most important source of power in modern societies,” derives from an 
organization. An organization, like a strong state, has “a foremost relationship with 
conditioned power” yet is capable of exerting effective coercive and compensatory powers 
as well.72 Democratic regimes73 hold and apply a unique combination of powers that are 
                                                 
70 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983), 6. 
71 Galbraith, 29. 
72 Galbraith, 57. 
73 “A state has to be governed according to some set of rules and practices. It is the rules and practices that 
constitute the regime. … a democratic regime is one in which those who make decisions are ultimately 
accountable to citizens via elections (and more specifically, elections that offer real choice, the freedom of 
parties and individuals to compete over differing visions of how the state should be governed).” Steven L. 
Taylor et al., A Different Democracy: American Government in a 31-Country Perspective (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2014), 14. 
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“tolerant of personality, protective of property, and in somewhat qualified defense of 
organization.”74 Since “[o]rganizations do influence government, bend it and therewith the 
people to their need and will,”75 this means that each governmental branch is inherently 
political.76 But why does power matter so much in politics? Simply put, “politics is about 
the authoritative allocation of values.”77 This means that those who hold power, make the 
rules (set values) and shape the environment to their liking.78 
The source of power behind each political branch and the democratic method of 
governing79 as a whole derives from conscious and unconscious obedience of the people it 
governs. Mass submission depends on effective conditioning of the polity to accept the 
hierarchical order,80 and via the promise of accountability,81 deem governmental statutes as 
legitimate.82 In the Americas, modern democratic systems of governance are politically 
                                                 
74 Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power, 82. 
75 Galbraith, 12–13. 
76 Max Weber believes that “politics” means striving to share power or striving to influence the 
distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 
in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2013), 40.  
77 Martin Shapiro, “Law and Politics: The Problem of Boundaries,” in The Oxford Handbook of Law and 
Politics, ed.Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Keith E. Whittington, Online Publication (Oxford: 
Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, 2009), 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0045.  
78 Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons 
from Four Constitutional Revolutions,” Law & Social Inquiry 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 94, 
https://jstor.org/stable/829019. 
79 Government is the “institutional arrangement for arriving at a political decisions which realizes the 
common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble 
in order to carry out its will.” Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 250. 
80 The authors state that “[i]n a hierarchy, one actor is subordinate to another. That is, agents exercise 
authority, but only at the behest of the principals, who continue to hold ultimate authority. This is hierarchy 
because authority flows in one direction, from the principals to the agents.” Taylor et al., A Different 
Democracy, 15.  
81 “In politics, accountability means that the agent’s rights to exercise authority can be revoked by the 
principal if the principal is not satisfied with the ways in which the agent exercising the delegated authority.” 
Taylor et al., 15. 
82 “Organized domination, which calls for continuous administration, requires that human conduct be 
conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be the bearers of legitimate power.” Weber, 
“Politics as a Vocation,” 40. 
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engineered83 and traditionally institutionalized84 via a written constitution.85 The 
constitution is used not only to provide the composition and intent of governance, but also as 
a means to connect and condition citizens and their government.86 A constitutional 
democracy87 obtains contingent consent88 from the population by securing “freedom of the 
individual from arbitrary authority”89 and institutionalizing political uncertainty.90 “A push 
toward democratic participation develops out of what we might call the logic of equality.”91 
In short, the link between democratization and constitutionalization acknowledges the power 
of the individual, encourages the power struggle between institutions,92 and defines the 
structure in which political power operates.93  
                                                 
83 Political engineering is the application of the principles of political science to a specific set of problems 
... (like)the failure of than existing set of institutional structures and the need to design replacements.” Taylor et 
al., A Different Democracy, 25. 
84 “the various powers must be habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, if not all, actors.” 
Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is..And Is Not,” 204. 
85 Constitutions are documents … that establish a basic framework for governance. Constitutions are, by 
definition, the highest law in a polity and therefore the source of all other laws.” “In the democratic tradition 
constitutions translate the abstract notion of popular sovereignty to paper and serve as a foundation upon which 
to build government.” Taylor et al., A Different Democracy, 60–61. 
86 A constitution serves as “codes of rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and 
duties among the various agencies and offices of government, and define the relationship between these and the 
public,” quoted in Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 36, per Finer; S. E. Finer, Five Constitutions, 1979 (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanitis Press, 1988); S. E. Finer, Five Constitutions (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 
1979), 15. 
87 A constitutional democracy “unites beliefs that although the people’s freely chosen representatives 
should govern, those officials must respect certain substantive limitations on their authority.” Walter F. 
Murphy, Constitutional Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 10. 
88 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is..And Is Not,” 208. 
89 Fareed Zakaria, “A Brief History of Human Liberty,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 
ed. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 189.  
90 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is..And Is Not,” 208. 
91 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 10. 
92 “Institutions … provide the structures and processes by which the authority of the principals are 
communicated to agents as well as through which the agents are made accountable to those principals. 
Furthermore, institutions are the vehicles through which the preferences of the principals are made manifest via 
the actions of the agents.” Taylor et al., A Different Democracy, 20. 
93 Taylor et al., 60. 
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A. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 
In a democracy, each branch of government is meant to reinforce the accountability-
hierarchy relationship, yet “the institutional structures that delegate popular sovereignty94 
into governance are … imperfect, and the degree to which politicians and bureaucrats can 
fulfill their roles as agents is flawed as well.”95 To address governmental structural defects, 
political engineers instituted a complex separation96 and balance of power97 mechanism 
responsible for curbing conflicting ambitions between factions.98 Balance of power is 
conducted to “weaken the omnipotence of the State, spreading its prerogatives.”99 The 
creation of three departments, legislative, executive and judiciary, guarantees “the 
distribution of governmental powers … to save the people [from] autocracy.”100 Thus, 
constitutionalism in its broadest terms “is the practice and method whereby limits on 
governmental powers are established and maintained.”101  
Constitutional guidelines for how the government operates are vague and 
generalized.102 “The precise working out of this blueprint as well as the daily function of 
                                                 
94 Popular sovereignty is defined as “a government that derives its authority to govern from the people, 
not from a king or aristocratic class that could assert power over a territory, or from a religious order that could 
claim a divine right to rule. Rather, when sovereign power comes from the populace, it becomes quite vital to 
define what that actually means in a practical sense. Taylor et al., 59. 
95 Taylor et al., 12. 
96 “The separation of powers does not mean their isolation because each branch of power participates in 
the functioning of the other through a system of mutual control and balancing.” Emilian Ciongaru, “The 
Principle of Separation of Powers—Constitutional Guarantee,” Challenges of the Knowledge Society 7 (May 
2017): 414, Proquest.  
97 “The concept of the separation of powers is a theory about the proper organization of government in 
which power is checked by power.” David Fellman, “The Separation of Powers and the Judiciary,” The Review 
of Politics 37, no. 3 (July 1975): 357, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406203.  
98 Taylor et al., A Different Democracy, 32–33. 
99 Ciongaru, “The Principle of Separation of Powers,” 412.  
100 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (dissenting opinion). Fellman, “The Separation of 
Powers and the Judiciary,” 357. 
101 Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner, and Cheryl Saunders, “Constitutions,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Constitutional Law, ed. Yasuo Hasebe and Cesare Pinelli (London: Routledge, 2012), 13, 
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203072578.ch1.  
102 “unlike the powers of Congress, which are enumerated, the Constitution vests in the president, in the 
most general of terms, “the executive Power,” Fellman, “The Separation of Powers and the Judiciary,” 363. 
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government is left to the legislative and executive powers of the state.”103 The power of the 
judiciary branch derives from its ability to interpret the constitutionality104 of laws and 
actions adopted by sister branches, as well as its own.105 Consequently, “constitutional 
interpretation is applied politics,”106 in so that national courts determine definitive107 
governmental support, rejection, or neglect for particular policies and enforce submission by 
the polity.108 Such polices generate overall “changes in the structure and operations of a 
political system−or … go as far as to create a different constitutional order.”109 
Constitution-making environments in America differ from one another.110 The 
creation of the constitution of the United States, for instance, was developed under a free 
and consensual process,111 while regional constitutions were cultivated under particular 
                                                 
103 Taylor et al., Different Democracy, 62. 
104 “The clauses of constitutional texts are typically general in nature; discovering their more specific 
meanings and applications to particular problems requires judgment and prudence as much as, and usually 
more than, linguistic and syllogistic skills.” Murphy, Constitutional Democracy, 4. 
105 “As the highest appellate court in the national government, [it] is often called upon to determine what 
the terms legislative, executive, and judicial power mean.” Fellman, “The Separation of Powers and the 
Judiciary,” 358. 
106 “The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary,” talk at the 25th anniversary of the Harvard Law Review (1912); 
reprinted in E. F. Pritchard and Archibald MacLeish, eds., Law and Politics: The Occasional Paper of Felix 
Frankfurter (1939; reprint New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), 6; Murphy, Constitutional Democracy, 4. 
107 “The Court, as a tribunal of last resort, speaks with finality, subject only to the possibility of being 
overruled by a constitutional amendment.” Murphy, 358. 
108 “Constitutional structures control social reality in general and public powers in particular.” Markus 
Kotzur, “Constitutionalism,” in Encyclopedia of Global Studies, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and Mark 
Juergensmeyer (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 2012), 278.  
109 Murphy, Constitutional Democracy, 18. 
110 Linz and Stepan list six constitution-making environments: “1. The retention of a constitution crated 
by a nondemocratic regime with reserve domains and difficult amendment procedures … 2. The retention of a 
“paper” constitution that has unexpected destabilizing and paralyzing consequences when used under more 
electorally competitive conditions … 3. The creation by a provisional government of a constitution with some 
de jure nondemocratic powers … 4. The use of constitution created under highly constraining circumstances 
reflecting the de facto power of nondemocratic institutions and forces … 5. The restoration of a previous 
democratic constitution … 6. Free and consensual constitution-making.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation, loc. 1645. 
111 “Delegates of the Continental Congress Who Signed the United States Constitution,” United States 




constraints.112 The first and oldest democratic constitution in the western hemisphere113 
was drafted by its Framers with purpose of “creat[ing] in America a republic that would 
retain the virtues of the English system without the vices of the monarchy.”114 The tenets 
and overarching values of the U.S. constitution have since been used as cornerstones for 33 
subsequent constitutions115 of Latin American countries, though “the exact manifestation of 
democratic governance globally differs from the U.S. model.”116 The global influence of 
the original text extended so much so, that it is now considered standard practice for nation-
states to adopt written constitutions.117 In fact, at one point, Latin American countries like 
Argentina and Brazil adopted exact excerpts of the U.S. constitution in their national 
constitution.118  
Constitutional influence or transplants “once grafted onto a different … .system … 
can grow, evolve, or atrophy.”119 Growth and evolution are normal as new ideas take shape 
in the state, while atrophy “stem[s] from a transplant being a mistake or mainly strategic 
with the importing polity having designs altogether different from those established in the 
exporting polity.”120 However, continued global influence of the United States is 
                                                 
112 “The Latin American experience illustrates that even borrowed institutions, such as written 
constitutions and judicial review, may function when planted in alien soil, albeit in a fashion that was not 
envisioned by their designers.” Miguel Schor, “Mapping Comparative Judicial Review,” Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 7, no. 2 (January 2008), 264, http://operscholarship.wustl.edu/
law_globalstudies/vol7/iss2/4. 
113 Taylor et al., A Different Democracy, 3. 
114 Dahl, On Democracy, 21. 
115 United States House of Representatives, “Delegates of the Continental Congress Who Signed the 
United States Constitution.”  
116 Taylor et al., A Different Democracy, 4. 
117 Dahl, On Democracy, 120. 
118 “Latin American constitutionalists continued to emulate North American ideas and institutions. Huge 
sections of two constitutions—Argentina’s in 1853 and Brazil’s in 1891—were copied word for word from the 
U.S. Constitution.” George A. Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776–1989: A 
Global Perspective (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 243.  
119 Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
14–15. 
120 The text notes various Latin American countries as examples of atrophy after constitutional influence 
or transplants take place. Rosenfeld and Sajó, “Introduction,” 15. 
 
 19 
debated,121 as it appears that similarities between Latin American and U.S. constitutions are 
in decline.122  
1. Historic Constitutionalism in the Americas 
Constitutionalism is the idea, often associated with the political theories of John 
Locke and the founders of the American republic, that government can and should be 
legally limited in its powers, and that its authority or legitimacy depends on observing these 
limitations.123 Constitutionalism “function[s] in the interest of the human being” by 
supporting civil rights and the social contract theory.124 Constitutionalism exists worldwide 
because “all legal systems have the same purpose of regulating and harmonizing the human 
activity within their respective societies.”125 Roman law and feudalism influenced English 
constitutionalism, which led to the creation of the common law legal system.126 Influenced 
by Napoleonic social, legal, and political revolutions, the civil law legal system, referred to 
the power of the state to form new institutions in accordance with a constitution.127 Though 
the two types of legal systems developed outside the Western Hemisphere, they were 
adopted in various areas of the American continent as indicated in Figures 1–4. 
                                                 
121 “other countries have, in recent decades, become increasingly unlikely to model either the rights-
related provisions or the basic structural provisions of their own constitutions upon those found in the U.S. 
Constitution.” David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” 
New York University Law Review 87, no. 3 (2012): 762; “Constitutions have incrementally and regularly taken 
on new bells and whistles; we call this constitutional modernization … despite this modernization, the influence 
of the U.S. Constitution remains evident; in fact, it has become increasingly more central compared to 
competing nineteenth-century alternatives. Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, in response to 
Law and Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,” 11.  
122 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26, Figure 2.1 Similarity between Latin American Constitutions and 
the U.S. Constitution, over Time. 
123 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Constitutionalism,” revised December 20, 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/. 
124 Kotzur, “Constitutionalism,” 278; Tushnet, Fleiner, and Saunders, “Constitutions,” 13.  
125 Joseph Dainow, “The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison,” The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 15, no. 3 (1966–1967): 419, https://www.jstor.org/stable/838275. 
126 Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl Saunders, “Constitutions Embedded in Different Legal Systems,” in 
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law, ed. Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner, and Cheryl Saunders (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 22, https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203072578.  




Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of Legal Systems in America: North 
America128 
 
Figure 2. Geographic Distribution of Legal Systems in America: Central 
America129 
                                                 
128 Source: “JuriGlobe: World Legal Systems,” University of Ottawa, accessed October 30 2018, 
www.juriglobe.ca/eng/rep-geo/index.php. 




Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of Legal Systems in America: South 
America130 
 
Figure 4. Geographic Distribution of Legal Systems in America: Caribbean131  
                                                 
130 Source: University of Ottawa. 
131 Source: University of Ottawa. 
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Common law “is built out of precedents and traditions that accumulate over time … 
[and] allow room for adaptation and change, but only within certain limits and only in ways 
that are rooted in the past.”132 Civil law states develop constitutions via a “process that 
equates to an act of a sovereign people” that rejects a constituent assembly and 
“distinguish[es] between the procedures used for total and partial constitutional revision.133  
One striking difference between legal systems is that in common law jurisdictions, 
judicial review pertains only to established laws, whereas in civil law systems, a party can 
challenge a law before, priori, and after, posteriori, it has passed by the legislature.134 
Furthermore, rulings in civil cases typically compel only the parties involved.135 The 
concept of inter partes is not applicable for common law rulings because decisions have 
erga omnes affect, which allows decisions to apply to similar or linked cases.136 Even 
though both systems are driven towards “gradual convergence,” common law systems “have 
a greater role in law making through open judicial interpretation” while civil law systems 
limit “judicial interpretation … [to] applying the written letter of the case, reflecting a 
stronger mistrust of the judges.”137  
A fundamental similarity between legal systems involves the idea that each 
country’s constitution “is best understood as a repository of shifting cultural values.”138 
Though there are considerable and noteworthy parallels between the two systems like 
                                                 
132 David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 15. “Common 
law constitutions may also provide different mechanisms for alteration of different parts of the constitution. 
Failure to comply with the prescribed requirements may also lead to an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment … the problem is one of process rather than substance, however , and likely to be analyzed in terms 
of constitutional interpretation rather than by reference to constituent power.” Fleiner and Saunders, 
“Constitutions Embedded in Different Legal Systems,” 24. 
133 Fleiner and Saunders, 24. 
134 Teresa M. Miguel-Stearns, “Judicial Power in Latin America: A Short Survey,” Legal Information 
Management 15, no. 2 (June 2015): 100, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1472669615000274, cited by Miguel Steans 
in Craig L. Arceneaux, Democratic Latin America (London: Pearson, 2013), 192. 
135 Miguel-Stearns, 100. 
136 Miguel-Stearns, 100. 
137 Domingo, “Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary?,” 106–107. 
138 Spann, “Constitutionalization,” 709. 
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acquiescence to “a tripartite separation of powers,”139 “the methods used to reach [similar 
solutions to legal problems] are nevertheless extremely divergent.”140 However, one thing 
is for certain, every written or unwritten code of law, outlines a political order that is reached 
through negotiations between agents that hold power.141 For example, “[i]n civil law 
jurisdictions, such as those in Latin America, courts traditionally are limited to applying the 
laws that have been created by the legislature or by executive decree” meaning that unlike 
common law jurisdictions,”[j]urisprudence142 has not historically been a source of law” 
within that system.143  
Latin America has “fertile ground for experiments in democratic governance,” and 
each state formed a distinct balance of power responsible for the outcome of current 
democratic systems.144 Nonetheless, the establishment of democracies in the region is not 
indicative of permanence.145 In fact, there have been democratization and reverse waves in 
the region.146 
The third wave of global democratization brought with it the creation of 29 
democratic nation-states,147 as well as the adoption of 36 new national constitutions.148 
                                                 
139 Fleiner and Saunders, “Constitutions Embedded in Different Legal Systems,” 24. 
140 Dainow, “The Civil Law and the Common Law,” 434. 
141 Javier Corrales, “Constitutional Rewrites in Latin America, 1987–2009,” in Constructing Democratic 
Governance in Latin America, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Smith (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013), 15.  
142 Latin for juris prudentia, the “study, knowledge, or science of law.” “Jurisprudence,”, Cornell Law 
School, accessed October 16, 2018, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jurisprudence. 
143 Miguel-Stearns, “Judicial Power in Latin America,” 100. 
144 Michael Shifter, “Introduction: New Structures in Democratic Governance,” in Constructing 
Democratic Governance in Latin America, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez and Michael Smith (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013), 7.  
145 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 11. 
146 A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that 
occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction 
during that period of time.” Huntington, The Third Wave, 15. A reverse wave occurs when “some but not all of 
the countries that had previously made the transition to democracy reverted to nondemocratic rule.” 
Huntington, The Third Wave, 15–16. 
147 Huntington, The Third Wave, 44. 




Between 1974 and 1990, the total number of democratic states worldwide nearly doubled 
from 30 to 59.149 Figure 5 depicts a link between the number of new countries and the rise 
in number of constitutions worldwide.  
  
Figure 5. New Constitutions150 
“[E]conomic development, industrialization, urbanization, the emergence of the 
bourgeoisie and of a middle class, the development of a working class and its early 
organization, and the gradual decrease in economic inequality” triggered the first wave of 
democratization.151 The second was in response to “[t]he victory of the established Western 
democracies in World War II and decolonization by those democracies after the war.”152 
                                                 
149 Huntington, The Third Wave, 26. 
150 Source: “Visualizations: New Constitutions,” Comparative Constitutions Project, 2016, 
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-visualizations/#. 
151 Huntington, The Third Wave, 39. 
152 Huntington, 40. 
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Legal transitions also occurred in parallel with democratization and the third wave and 
“alter[ed] political dynamics by raising the constitutional and judicial stakes.”153 However, 
the apparent popularity of democratic governance was short lived as various nations 
regressed and reestablished nondemocratic regimes along with compromised legal 
institutions after each wave.154 Samuel Huntington argues that Argentina and Uruguay 
suffered democratic setbacks on both the first and second waves, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Peru endured a reverse democratic wave in the second phase, and a Suriname and 
Haiti maybe facing a third reverse.155  
The third wave crested when democracies peaked at 65 in 1990,156 and currently 
reflect a “crisis syndrome” as Latin American countries falter in their democratic 
transformation process.157 Experts express concern over the decline of democratic countries 
and link them with weakening158 or decay159 of political institutions.160 If this notion is 
true, consolidated democracies face the same challenges in “behavioral, attitudinal, and 
                                                 
153 Diana Kapiszewski, High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil, A Comparative 
Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 37. 
154 “The third wave crested after the late 1990s, however, and a “democratic recession” emerges in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century.” Francis Fukuyama, “The Necessity of Politics,” in Essential Readings 
in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton: 2013), 26.  
155 Huntington, The Third Wave, 14.  
156 Huntington, 14; Dahl, On Democracy, 8. 
157 “Transformation Index BTI, Latin America and the Caribbean,” Bartelsmann Stiftung, accessed 
October 16, 2018, https://www.bti-project.org/en/key-findings/regional/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.  
158 “Nation-states exist to deliver political goods−security, education, health services, economic 
opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and 
fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities−to their citizens.” 
“Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people.” “State failure is 
man-made, not merely accidental nor−fundamentally−caused geographically, environmentally, or externally. 
Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” in Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 
ed. Patrick H O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), 61–65.  
159 “Political decay occurs when political systems fail to adjust to changing circumstances.” Fukuyama, 
“The Necessity of Politics,” 28.  
160 “The perennial enemies of popular government: economic decline, corruption, oligarchy, war, 
conquest, seizure, of power by authoritarian rules, whether princes, monarchs, or soldiers.” Dahl, On 
Democracy, 15–16. “If and when many citizens fail to understand that democracy requires certain fundamental 
rights or fail to support the political, administrative, and judicial institutions that protect those rights, then their 
democracy is in danger.” Dahl, 50. 
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constitutional dimension[s]” as they did during the consolidating process.161 According to 
Samuel Huntington wave ebbing occurred because “(1) the weakness of democratic values 
among key elite groups and the general public; (2) economic crisis or collapse that 
intensified social conflict and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could only be 
imposed by authoritarian governments; (3) social and political polarization often produced 
by leftist governments attempting to introduce or appearing to introduce many major 
socioeconomic reforms too quickly; (4) the determination of conservative middle- and 
upper-class groups to exclude populist and leftist movement and lower-class groups from 
political power; (5) the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism or insurgency; 
(6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign government; (7) snowballing in the 
form of the democratization effects of the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in 
other countries.”162 Hence, to protect democratic norms from atrophy, constitutional 
changes must back the behavioral and attitudinal strengthening of political institutions. For 
this to take place, however, the judicial branch must secure enough power to establish 
“provisions … allowing for revision or amendment of the constitution … so future 
generations [are] able to deliver themselves from the yolk of those previous.”163 
2. Timeline and Revisions Chart of Constitutions 
As with governmental systems, the “lifespans of written constitutions” are 
unspecified.164 Though most original framers intended constitutions to endure,165 
democracies face the challenges of accommodating multiple agents vying for power, and in 
                                                 
161 Behaviorally, the polity produces no significant actors that aspire secession or the creation of a 
nondemocratic regime. Attitudinally, the polity accepts a general consensus that democratic rule is superior to 
nondemocratic options. Constitutionally, the polity accepts and upholds “laws, procedures, and institutions 
sanctioned by the … democratic process.” Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation, loc. 371, 382.  
162 Huntington, The Third Wave, 290. 
163 Claude Klein and András Sajó, “Constitution-making: Process and Substance,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (United Kingdom: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 438–439. 
164 Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton, DRAFT: The Lifespan of Written Constitutions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007), 1, http://jenni.uchicago.edu/WJP/Vienna_2008/Ginsburg-Lifespans-
California.pdf.  
165 One famous dissenter in the topic is Thomas Jefferson, who opted for a rewrite of the constitution 
during each lifetime (19 years). Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 1–2. 
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the struggle, endanger their very existence.166 Since “a certain degree of habitation must 
occur before … institutions can take shape,” democracies with new constitutions tend to 
reflect the stable or turbulent nature of the times.167 In fact, “most constitutions die young, 
and only a handful last longer than fifty years.”168 The mean life expectancy for Latin 
American constitutions is 12.4 years, but the global baseline is 19 years.169 The baseline 
statistic provides a “sense of when in their life cycle constitutions are most vulnerable,” 
meaning that Latin American constitutions are especially susceptible.170 A solution to the 
mortality issue can be a catch 22, as the only way to solve the “compressed time” dilemma 
is to allow governments even more time to address political power sharing.171  
According to Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, the longer a 
democratic constitution is in place, the stronger the democratic system it enables.172 
Compared with nondemocratic regimes, democracies tend to promote regime stability by 
increasing the expectancy of a constitution from 15 to 21 years.173 This is not to say that the 
goal of a regime is to seek a long-lasting, unchanging constitution, much the opposite. A 
regime must balance the “social, economic, and technological changes [that] occur” and 
determine if it is “altogether appropriate that the constitution be shed, let it stunt the growth 
of the nation inside it.”174 
                                                 
166 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry L. Karl, “What Democracy Is … and Is Not,” in Essential Readings 
in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), 207.  
167 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 3–4. 
168 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 1. 
169 Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton, “The Lifespan of Written Constitutions,” The 
University of Chicago Law School, October 15, 2009, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/lifespan-written-
constitutions; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 129. 
170 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 129. 
171 “Written constitutions do not specify all the details of their institutions … (nor) ensure their 
implementation.” Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton, DRAFT: The Lifespan of Written Constitutions, 13. 
172 “Enduring constitutions are good for young democracies. Endurance allows the polity to grow into the 
institutions of government, but also adapts the constitution to its own needs.” Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 
The Endurance of National Constitutions, 35; “We are most struck by a general finding that most of the 
purposes that are ascribed to constitutions, such as entrenching fundamental principles or providing normative 
guidance for the polity, seem to improve with age.”). Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National 
Constitutions, 6. 
173 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 137. 
174 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, 35. 
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Such constitutional changes tell a story of democratic stability and instability, when 
seen in parallel with the passage of time. Figure 6 provides an overview of a country’s 
constitutional transformation since its creation.175  
 
Figure 6. Timeline of Constitutions176 
                                                 
175 The Comparative Constitutions Project provides information on active and defunct historical states. 
For example, the constitutions of Great Colombia and the United Provinces of Central America were no longer 
in force in 1830 and 1839. “Timelines of Constitutions,” Comparative Constitutions Project, 2016, 
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology/. 
176 Source: Comparative Constitutions Project, “Timelines of Constitutions.”  
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Concern over regime stability is marred with the need to keep constitutions relevant, 
because “[a] constitution that cannot change cannot endure.”177 Furthermore, the common 
finding among experts is that “most of the purposes that are ascribed to constitutions, such 
as entrenching fundamental principles or providing normative guidance for the polity, seem 
to improve with age.”178 The general ideas of permanence and flexibility are central to the 
study of constitutions. As seen in Figure 7, there have been 843 changes in Latin American 
constitutions since the creation of the first regional constitution in 1805.179 Out of these, 
245 were due to the adoption of new constitutions and 583 were amendments,180 but still, 
regime stability is not easily determined by these figures. 
 
Figure 7. Latin America Constitution Statistics181 
                                                 
177 Murphy, Constitutional Democracy, 333. 
178 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 6. 
179 Comparative Constitutions Project, “Timelines of Constitutions.” 
180 Adapted from Comparative Constitutions Project, “Timelines of Constitutions.” I downloaded the 
CCP data from the site and made a spreadsheet with LATAM-only countries. Note: Except for material 
identified as copyrighted by other parties, the content of constituteproject.org is provided under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License (which allows you to make free use of 
information from the site for noncommercial purposes). Comparative Constitutions Project, “Download 
CCP Data.”  
181 Adapted from Comparative Constitutions Project, “Timelines of Constitutions.” I downloaded the 
CCP data from the site and made a spreadsheet with LATAM-only countries. Note: Except for material 
identified as copyrighted by other parties, the content of constituteproject.org is provided under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License (which allows you to make free use of 




Democratic standing is not directly attributable to the number of new 
constitutions or amendments. Written constitutions have the ability to change via 
modifications, or amendment procedures than undoubtedly modify the standing balance 
of power. 
B. JUDICIAL POWERS 
A review on the history and structures of constitutions is helpful, but limited with 
regard to the issues raised in this thesis. Further research on judicialization rests on 
judicial empowerment (or over-empowerment) reinforced through constitutionalization. 
Key research approaches are based on cases that ignore the long-standing tradition of the 
justiciability doctrine,182 advance toward constitutional judicial review,183 and 
ultimately affect the democratic process.184 
To study judicialization is to study the judicial review powers of supreme 
courts.185 The United States and Latin America, as the “two greatest regions in the world 
for judicial review in the nineteenth century,”186 have solidified the legitimacy and 
supremacy of constitutional interpretations as court norms.187 As discussed previously, 
the power to set judicial norms rests on a country’s constitution, which also outlines its 
limits.188 “Judicial adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers preserves the 
courts for the decision of issues, between litigants, capable of effective determination. 
                                                 
182 The justiciability doctrine determines the limits of federal courts to adjudicate disputes. It impedes 
the court from accepting and deciding cases where “resolution is more proper within the political 
branches.” Cole, The Political Question Doctrine, 4; Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Politics,” 1. 
183 Judicial review cases guarantees the power of the judicial branch to interpret and uphold the 
supreme law. Marbury v. Madison, 180. 
184 Russell A. Miller, “Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of “Pure Politics” in the United 
States and Germany,” Washington and Lee Law Review 61, no. 2 (March 2004): 587–662, 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol61/iss2/3. 
185 Martin Shapiro, “The United States,” in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, ed. C. Neal Tate 
and Torbjörn Vallinder (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 45.  
186 Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776–1989, 107. 
187 “Comparative Constitutional Study,” Political Database of the Americas, last updated March 8, 
2009, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Comp/Judicial/normas.html. 
188 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US. 90 (1947) from Fellman, “The Separation of Powers 
and the Judiciary,” 360. 
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Judicial exposition upon political proposals is permissible only when necessary to decide 
definite issues between litigants. When the courts act continually within these 
constitutionally imposed boundaries of their power, their ability to perform their function 
as a balance for the people’s protection against abuse of power by other branches of 
government remains unimpaired.”189 However, if courts excessively abstain or indulge 
in the duties outlined by the constitution, an imbalance occurs in the other powers of the 
state. 
The overall power of the supreme court is expressed via potential and active 
powers.190 Potential power involves jurisdiction and discretion, while active power 
covers assertiveness and authoritativeness of courts.191 Jurisdiction involves the scope of 
and ability “of a court to adjudicate cases and issue orders”192 and the “court’s decision-
making latitude [as] constrained by legal-institutional rules, and by political calculations 
and context.”193 The potential aspect of judicial power is largely reliant on the ability of 
the court to exert legitimate power where able.194 The active power of the court means 
that it is capable of challenging power-players and producing compelling, binding rulings 
when those power-players are defeated in court.195 
The perils of indulging in judicial power beyond the scope outlined in the 
constitution leads to judicialization. It is important to keep in mind that “while 
unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and the legislative branches of the 
Government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on [judicial] exercise of power 
                                                 
189 United Public Workers v. Mitchell from Fellman, “The Separation of Powers and the Judiciary,” 
360. 
190 Kapiszewski and Taylor, “Doing Courts Justice?,” 750. 
191 Kapiszewski and Taylor, 750. 
192 “Jurisdiction,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, accessed May 1, 2018, 
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is [its] own sense of self-restraint.”196 Equally important, is the rationale by which a 
statute is considered unconstitutional, particularly if developed by legislative 
representatives that draw their legitimate power from the same constitution as do 
judges.197 Concerns over who controls judges and what judges control are always at the 
center of the debate. Supreme court judges are known to utilize control mechanisms that 
affect the timing and exposure of cases 
1. Docket Control 
Docket control exemplifies the power of judges to abstain from hearing a case.198 
This power is not unlike the “agenda control” powers exercised by the legislative and 
executive branches.199 The apparent bias in case acceptance allows the court to align the 
decisions of controversial constitutional cases with more palatable times in the course of 
a country’s social-political progress. Docket control, or certiorari,200 gives the court 
“power to decide what to decide” increasing the court’s legitimacy and lessening political 
damage.201 One of the most important questions to ponder is whether courts “may be a 
suitable setting−perhaps even the best one, both in terms of their institutional position in 
a democracy and in terms of the judges’ expertise−for assessing evidence, for 
                                                 
196 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (dissenting opinion) from Fellman, “The Separation of 
Powers and the Judiciary,” 358–359. 
197 “A statute cannot be unconstitutional because, if it is truly unconstitutional, it is invalid and an 
invalid statute is not a statute at all. In other words, although the content of a statute may be contrary to the 
constitution, it has been enacted by a legislature that draws its authority from the constitution and remains 
valid until annulled by the body constitutionally entitled to do so. Thus, because of the essential 
requirement of hierarchical validation for every legal norm, the project of constitutionalism cannot 
eliminate all state actions contrary to the constitution.” Tushnet, Fleiner, and Saunders, “Constitutions,” 15. 
198 David Fontana, “Docket Control and the Success of the Constitutional Courts in Comparative 
Constitutional Law,” George Washington University Law School, 624, 2011, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2256946. 
199 Fontana, 624. 
200 A writ of certiorari allows the Supreme Court to request a case from lower courts for review. “It is 
not under any obligation to hear these cases, and it usually only does so if the case could have national 
significance, might harmonize conflicting decisions in the federal Circuit courts, and/or could have 
precedential value.” “Supreme Court Procedures,” United State Courts, accessed October 16, 2018, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-
resources/supreme-1.  
201 Fontana, “Docket Control and the Success of the Constitutional Courts in Comparative 
Constitutional Law,” 624. 
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determining responsibility for alleged wrongdoing, or for dealing with matters of 
procedural justice and fairness, it is ultimately unclear what makes courts an appropriate 
forum for deciding what are quandaries of a purely and substantively political nature,” 
and when exactly is the best time to address them.202 The main complication is that there 
are no clear measures for justiciability. Furthermore, even if measures did exist, it begs 
the question as to why various national court agents are endowed with such power. While 
some constitutional judicial review courts enjoy the benefits of docket control, others do 
not.  
Institutional variation between docket control countries and those that require 
national courts to hear all dispute cases means there are efficiency differences among 
courts.203 It is no surprise, that a court’s efficiency level affect the ability of the 
organization to project power. In countries with docket control, like that of the United 
States, courts tend to focus on difficult cases while outright rejecting others and 
neglecting to provide litigants with the “justice” they seek.204 Countries without docket 
control have an overworked courts and a buildup of cases.205  
2. Judge Outlook 
When supreme or constitutional court judges do accept cases, it is worth noting 
that they too, fall into two frames of thought when making decisions. The distinct 
outlooks are polarized and contribute to “the great debate.”206 According to Richard 
Duncan, judicial interpretation rests on polarization between theories regarding the 
interpretation of the constitution itself. Judges who ascribe to originalism, according to 
them, are said to adhere to the real rule of law of the constitution versus political decrees 
                                                 
202 Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts,” 99. 
203 Tom S. Clark and Aaron B. Strauss, “The Implications of High Court Docket Control for Resource 
Allocation and Legal Efficiency,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 22, no. 2 (2010): 247–248, 
https://doi.org/10.117/0951629809359036. 
204 Clark and Strauss, 265. 
205 Clark and Strauss, 265. 
206 Richard Duncan considers the great debate between originalism and the living constitution to 
originate from the debate between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull. Richard F. Duncan, 
“Justice Scalia and the Rule of Law” Originalism vs. The Living Constitution,” Regent University Law 
Review 29, no. 1 (2006): 12–13.  
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made by judges.207 Real rule of law, for originalists, means that the constitution is taken 
as a set of laws with “original intent” to address specific problems.208 This position is 
summed by the idea that a nation’s “Constitution is not a living organism. It’s a legal 
document, and it says what it says and does not say what it doesn’t say.”209 A judge that 
subscribes to the originalism outlook supports the evolution and modification of a 
nation’s constitution only when amendments follow the steps outlined within.210 A 
correlated idea of originalism is that “amendments should come from the people, not the 
Supreme Court.”211 Clearly stated, “the Court’s job is to apply the Constitution, not to 
write the Constitution.”212 
Nonoriginalist judges are those who believe in a “living constitution,” versus a 
written one.213 They affirm that the world changes at a rapid pace and the inability to 
easily process amendments is at fault for out-of-date constitutional interpretations.214 
The nonoriginalist argument centers on the idea that there are various parts of the 
constitution that are clear and those that “do not give us such unequivocal instructions,” 
making interpretation necessary.215 Nonoriginalists believe that looking at the 
constitution with a historical lens addresses limited issues, prevents progress, and forces 
                                                 
207 Duncan, 9. 
208 Antonin Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,” University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1989, 852. 
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people to ascribe to decisions made under a much different reality than the one they 
currently face.216  
The issues in the great debate are not just theoretical; they expand into the actual 
decision-making process of each judge. Siding with either originalist and nonoriginalist 
interpretation means that judges concur or dissent based on their own individual moral 
values. When originalists make a call, they exercise judicial restraint.217 When 
nonoriginalists provide their view of the case, they are conducting judicial activism.218 
Either decision is in and of itself affirming the reason for a constitution and its acceptable 
flexibility based on a moment in time.  
Adopting constitutions or amendments and justifying their interpretation “are 
products of a larger legal project.”219 Constitutions “are … exercises in practical politics,” 
and reflect the attitudes of law and beyond it; furthermore, the use of constitutions is 
rationalized and justified with “arguments from political philosophy.”220 The overall legal 
project exerts control over “a wide network of human relations, [that] inevitably interacts 
with the broader culture, sometimes shaping it, sometimes shaped by it.”221 
3. Landmark Cases 
Court decisions that shape society and history are labeled landmark decisions, 
which, in turn, brand landmark cases.222 Thought the term is subjective, national courts 
                                                 
216 Strauss, 14, 23. 
217 Judicial restraint occurs when “judges have identified certain questions as being inappropriate for 
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person on a particular matter.” Jeff A. King, “Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint,” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 28, no. 3 (2008): 409, https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqn020. 
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list and publicize the most important cases and their outcomes, relevant to their particular 
institutional and national history.223 Due to their novelty, landmark decisions on new 
cases rarely make the official governmental “landmark case list” though they have long-
lasting and transformational consequences. To determine if cases from 1999 to 2017 are 
landmark cases in Brazil and Uruguay, a subjective approach is also necessary. Landmark 
status, therefore, stems from the determination of national governmental and non-
governmental sources.  
C. CONSTITUTIONALIZATION THEORIES 
In order to answer if and why judicialization is taking place in Brazil and 
Uruguay, and address the diverse arguments surrounding the topic, I draw on the five 
most prominent legal transformation theories: constitutional politics, evolutionist, 
systemic, needs-based, microlevel rational choice, and hegemonic preservation.224 These 
theories explain, albeit from different perspectives, the unique power context in which 
judges perform their duties. 
1. Constitutional Politics 
The theory of constitutional politics “understands judicial empowerment through 
the constitutionalization of rights either as the outcome of political efforts by well-
organized minority groups to limit the policy preferences of majorities or as the by-
product of majority political leaders’ benign attempts to prevent a disintegration of the 
polity by creating consociational constitutional arrangements.”225 The theory relies on 
                                                 
223 “Julgamentos historicos [Historical judgements],” Supremo Tribunal Federal, updated October 11, 
2018, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/
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the belief that peripheral groups utilize judicial review functions to check policymakers’ 
intent thereby preventing “the tyranny of the majority.”226 
2. Evolutionist 
Evolutionist theory “defines the trend toward constitutionalization of rights and the 
fortification of judicial review as an inevitable by-product of a new and near-universal 
prioritization of human rights in the wake of World War II.”227 The theory rejects the idea 
of fixed constitutions, draws conclusions form a rapidly evolving world, and leads toward a 
prediction of a universal human rights singularity.228 Certainty in progress arises from the 
“acceptance and enforcement of the idea that democracy is not the same thing as majority 
rule; that in a real democracy, minorities possess legal protections in the form of a written 
constitution, which even a parliament cannot change.”229 
3. Systemic, Needs-Based 
The systemic, needs based approach “suggest that the expansion of judicial power 
derives [as a solution] to a structural, organic political problem.”230 The utilitarian theory 
denies the effects of individual agency and focuses solely on the most logical step for a 
polarized or deadlocked legal system to take in order to continue operating.231 The 
objective of the legal system is to continue to function, so it must do so by adjusting its 
previous stance to fulfill political requirements. 
4. Microlevel Rational Choice 
The microlevel rational choice theory accounts for “human choices [that] are likely 
to reflect the preferences of rational political power holders, who attempt to shape the 
                                                 
226 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays on America (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2003), 292; Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through 
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institutional setting in which they operate to suit their interests.”232 Whether the decision 
justifies constitutionalization via “credible commitments,” the fulfillment of a “fire alarm” 
mechanism, or successfully competing in the electoral market, the bottom line is that 
political actors will support judicial independence only when it is beneficial to their 
particular situation.233 
5. Hegemonic Preservation 
Hegemonic preservation theory is “[a] realist, strategic approach to judicial 
empowerment [which] focuses on various power-holders’ self-interested incentives for 
deference to the judiciary.”234 This theory relies on the agency of the individual, as “legal 
innovators‒politicians representing cultural and economic elites, in corporation with the 
judicial elite‒determining the timing, extent, and nature of legal reforms.”235 It stipulates 
that when powerholders face competition in the political system, they are willing 
participants in “the voluntarily transfer of policymaking authority to courts through 
constitutionalization” to produce “new constitutional arrangements … likely to enhance 
their relative power vis-á-vis other elements.”236 
D. IMPACT OF JUDICIALIZATION THEORIES ON THE ARENAS OF 
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION  
In establishing the initial assessment of the impact of each theory on democratic 
consolidation, I assessed four of the five arenas of consolidated democracies. I did not take 
into account economic society, as this arena would only pertain in judicial review cases 
dealing with national economic regulation. The constitutional politics theory of judicial 
empowerment requires high civil society to be in place along with respect for rule of law. 
That society may not necessarily need to be too politically active or live in a state with a 
highly effective and usable bureaucracy. Evolutionist theory prioritizes the rule of law over 
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all other arenas meaning that civil society, political society, and a usable bureaucracy is less 
important or necessary within a country for judicial change to occur because it becomes 
essentially inescapable. For the systemic, needs based theory, an active civil or political 
society is not relevant. Respect and innovation in the rule of law is only possible because the 
government sees it as the most effective way to stamp out political unruliness within its 
ranks. Constitutionalization according to microlevel, rational choice theory, accounts for 
actors in the civil and political arenas. These actors are not primarily concerned with the rule 
of law, but in utilizing the existing bureaucracy to best suit their interest. Lastly, hegemonic 
preservation theory gives a low priority to a state’s civil society and rule of law. At the core, 
this theory emphasizes support for rule of law only when political actors can increase their 
power. The usable bureaucracy of the judicial branch provides the avenue to compete for 
power and still win when new constitutional arrangements are outlined. 
Legal transofmation theories account for variances in motivation. Each theory is 
attached to reasoning that produces unique values concerning the arenas of democratic 
consolidation. An exclusive power relationship arrangement is thus created between 
democracy and judicialization. In Table 2, an assessment of high, medium, low or absent 
illustrates the effects in the democratic arenas of case studies and their correlation with 
particular legal transformation theories. 
Table 2. Theoretical Framework and Consolidated Democracy Status 
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
















Constitutional Politics H M H M A 
Evolutionist M/L L H M/L A 
Systemic, Needs Based L L M/H H A 
Microlevel, Rational Choice H H L H A 





Through an exploration of power, organizations, and legal systems, it is evident 
that distinct constitutional identities have developed in American states. A state’s 
constitutional identity comes from having a constitution that establishes a preferred legal 
system, how that constitution organizes society, and the role the constitutions plays in 
shaping that society.237 Tasked as with the unique role of interpreters, judges fill national 
courts that determine the constitutionality of cases, and simultaneously, the reality of the 
society in which they live. The five theories of judicial empowerment are driven by 
distinct power relationships. When judicialization occurs, the existing power 
relationships morph to create a new democratic reality. Therefore, through the 
adjudication of politicized topics, national courts and its agents define the constitutional 
identity of a nation and exercise power that alters its democratization process.  
“As the list of areas in which courts intervene has grown, the judiciary has 
emerged as one of the most important—if still deeply contested–institutions in 
posttransition Latin American politics.”238 Therefore, the study of constitutional law via 
national courts does present the issue of researching the “admittedly most political court 
and most political body of law,” but it also provides clear examples of how top-down 
decisions affect a country.239 Undoubtedly, those entrusted to the highest courts “are 
engaged with the great issues of their times.”240 
                                                 
237 Michel Rosenfeld, “Constitutional Identity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 757. 
238 Gretchen Helmke, Courts in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), loc. 
118 of 9909, Kindle.  
239 Shapiro and Sweet, On Law Politics and Judicialization, 34. 
240 Peter Irons, The History of the Supreme Court: Chapter 10, The Great Courses, narrated by Peter 
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III. CASE STUDY OF JUDICIALIZATION: BRAZIL  
This chapter provides an overview of judicialization in Brazil. It begins by 
explaining the power context in which the judicial branch and the national court operate 
and proceeds to provide judicialization statistics in Brazil over a 20-year period. The 
chapter also deep-dives into a case of judicialization and the consequences it has on the 
arenas of a consolidating democracy. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Brazil is a federative republic241 that has three branches of government.242 The 
executive branch is comprised of an elected president that acts as the head of state and 
fulfills a term of four years.243 Brazil’s legislature is structured as a bicameral national 
congress comprised of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies.244 A legal system at the 
state and national levels constitutes the legislative branch, where national courts only 
concern themselves with “disputes between states and matters outside the jurisdiction of 
state courts.245 Brazil has a 2-court [judicial], civil-law system that, “help[s] establish the 
rules of governing the political game, oversee the implementation of rules governing 
political authorities, and punish those who step over these lines.”246 The electoral court 
system concerns itself with administrative issues in electoral processes, and has 
                                                 
241 Federal republic is “a state in which the powers of the central government are restricted and in 
which the component parts (states, colonies, or provinces) retain a degree of self-government; ultimate 
sovereign power rests with the voters who chose their governmental representatives.” “The World 
Factbook, Field Listing: Government Type,” CIA, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http://teacherlink.ed.usu.edu/tlresources/reference/factbook/fields/
2128.html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=M. “[R]epublic, from res, meaning thing or affair 
in Latin, and publicus, public: loosely rendered, a republic was the thing that belonged to the people.” Dahl, 
On Democracy, 13. 
242 “The Constitution of Brazil 1988 (Rev 2017): Article 2 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988,” 
Constitutute Project, trans. Keith S. Rosenn, accessed October 14, 2018, https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Brazil_2017?lang=en. 
243 “Brazil: Political Structure,” Economist, Intelligent Unit, December 1, 2018. 
244 Economist Intelligence Unit.  
245 Economist Intelligence Unit. 
246 Matthew Taylor, “The Federal Judiciary and Electoral Courts,” in Corruption and Democracy in 
Brazil, ed. Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2011), 165.  
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“additional responsibilities for monitoring malfeasance related to campaigns and voting, 
and imposing political sanctions such as loss of office.247 The Brazilian Supreme Federal 
Tribunal (STF) constitutes the second court system and is “by practice an appellate court 
and by vocation a constitutional court.248  
The STF “is composed by eleven Justices, chosen among native Brazilian citizens 
who are more than thirty-five and less than sixty-five years old and have notable legal 
knowledge and soundness of character.”249 STF judges are selected via a Presidential 
nomination, are approved by an absolute majority of the Federal Senate250 and have the 
opportunity to serve until 75 years of age.251 The judges do not have docket control, but 
are allowed timing control via a pedido de vista.252 Since the political question doctrine 
does not fully apply, and justices must see all cases brought to them, the STF is “forced 
to decide important issues of economic and social policy.”253 
The 2004 Judicial Reform “introduced profound alterations” to address relevant 
constitutional controversies.254 Recently, an increased caseload, has led the STF to 
                                                 
247 Taylor, 165. 
248 Taylor, 173. 
249 “Current Structure of the Supreme Federal Court,” Portal STF Internacional, accessed October 12, 
2018, http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/
verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idConteudo=120283; Constitutute Project, “The 
Constitution of Brazil 1988 (Rev 2017).”  
250 “Federal Supreme Court,” Portal STF Internacional, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/
verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idConteudo=283524. 
251 “The Constitution of Brazil 1988 (Rev 2017): Article 100,” Constitutute Project, trans. Keith S. 
Rosenn, accessed October 1, 2018, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017#s5523.  
252 A pedido de visa is a legal request for time to analyze case files. When granted, it is responsible 
for the increase in the length of judicial proceedings. Diego Wernek Arguelhes, and Ivar A. Hartmann, 
“Timing Control without Docket Control,” Journal of Law and Courts, 107, 114, Spring 2017, 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/690195. 
253 Keith S. Rosenn, “Recent Important Decisions by the Brazilian Supreme Court,” The University of 
Miami Inter-American Law Review 45, no 2 (Spring 2014): 332, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24375768. 
254 Wilson Center, Brazil Institute, Rule of Law Series: Brazil (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 
2017), 5, https://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/bi_rule_of_law-toffoli_finalv2.pdf. 
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increase efficiency.255 Judges interpret the Brazilian constitution of 1988, which counts 
with 22 subsequent amendments, the most recent in 2013.256 Furthermore, an 
amendment to the constitution allowed the creation of a separate constitutional court in 
the STF, which acts as the “guardian of the fundamental law.”257 These important 
purpose and procedural changes have allowed the STF to be considered “one of the most 
powerful courts in the world.”258 
Brazil’s national judicial statistics report the overall annual caseload for the STF. 
The total caseload for the STF indicate a modest increase from 54,437 in 1999 to 56,257 
in 2017, but also highlight extreme variation, as reflected in record-setting statistics of 
2006. Out of the STF total caseload, 5,562 cases are categorized as Direct Acts of 
Unconstitutionality (ADI).259 ADIs “are the main instrument of judicial review in the 
Brazilian judicial system” and require decision by all members of the court.260 The total 
number of judicial review cases decided by the STF rose from 0 in 1999 to 524 in 2017 
signaling a pronounced negative correlation between the total number of cases seen by 
the STF, and those that deal with judicial review.261 STF statistics identify the court’s 
mixture of unprecedented willingness to decide cases of unconstitutionality with self-
                                                 
255 O número de processos recebidos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal aumentou 22,95% de 2012 
(73.464) até 2016 (90.331). O número de decisões igualmente aumentou, o que significa maior eficiência 
na prestaçãoda jurisdição. Em 2012, foram proferidas 72.185 decisões finais pelos órgãos do Supremo 
Tribunal,enquanto, em 2016, chegaram elas ao total de 9.314, num aumento de 32,04% (translated from the 
Brazilian Portuguese text: The number of cases received by the Federal Supreme Court increased by 
22.95% in 2012 (73,464) until 2016 (90,331). The number of decisions has also increased, which means 
greater efficiency in the provision of jurisdiction. In 2012, 72,185 final decisions were handed down by the 
Supreme Court, while in 2016 they reached a total of 9,314, an increase of 32.04%). “Palavra da 
Presidente,” Supremo Tribunal Federal, accessed October 12, 2018, http://stf.jus.br/relatorio2016/. 
256 Brazil Comparative Constitutions Project, “Timeline of Constitutions,” citing Elkins, Ginsburg, 
and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions. 
257 Wilson Center, Brazil Institute, Rule of Law Series: Brazil, 3.  
258 Rosenn, “Recent Important Decisions by the Brazilian Supreme Court,” 298.  
259 “In an ADI the STF directly exerts its role as a constitutional court.” Pedro Fernando Almeida 
Nery Ferreira and Bernando Mueller, “How Judges Think In the Brazilian Supreme Court: Estimating Ideal 
Points and Identifyin Dimensions,” National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, August 
26, 2014, 277. 
260 “In an ADI the STF directly exerts its role as a constitutional court.” Ferreira and Mueller, “How 
Judges Think in the Brazilian Supreme Court,” 279. 
261 “Estadísticas do STF: ADI [Statistics of STF: ADI],” Supremo Tribunal Federal, accessed October 
31, 2018, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=adi.  
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imposed judicial limits. Figure 8 corroborates the notion that the court engages in the 
political quandaries of the times, but does so under improved efficiency parameters 
within judge control. 
 
Figure 8. Brazil STF Docket262 
The “historic, ongoing transformation in Latin America’s largest country” reflects 
shifts in the workings of governmental institutions.263 The STF has transitioned to 
occupy an “important role in supporting the growth and development of democratic 
institutions”264 to the extent that the court is now the “guardian of … democratic state of 
                                                 
262 Adapted from Supremo Tribunal Federal. 
263 Wilson Center, Brazil Institute, Rule of Law Series: Brazil, iii. 
264 Rosenn, “Recent Important Decisions by the Brazilian Supreme Court,” 332. 
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law and … an institution of fundamental importance to democratic stability in Brazil.”265 
The perceived efficiency and judicialization of the court produce unique consequences in 
the arenas of democratization. 
B. CASES AFFECTING DEMOCRACY 
Brazil’s democratic status is ranked 23rd in the world according to the 
Bartlesmann Stiftung Transformation Index of 2018.266 Due to massive corruption 
scandals and the impeachment of the President Dilma Rousseff, the country currently 
experiences “the most serious political and economic crisis since … [its] return to 
democracy.”267 The index warns that democratic institutions are weakened by instability 
and that the judiciary plays a role in exacerbating the problem.268 However, Brazil is also 
“the fourth largest democracy in the world … the largest in Latin America, and ... [it 
boasts a] remarkable institutional evolution over its most recent‒and longest‒experiences 
with democracy.269 
One of the most recent and memorable experiences in the political history of 
Brazil, the Mensalão scandal, involves unprecedented actions by all three governmental 
branches.270 In the briefest of summaries, the Mensalão scandal, implicated senior aides 
of the executive branch in an illegal vote-buying scheme of members of Congress.271 
Though congressional investigations were ongoing, the judicial branch, represented by 
the members of the national court, “announced it would approve … indictments and that 
                                                 
265 Wilson Center, Brazil Institute, Rule of Law Series: Brazil, 18. 
266 “Brazil Overall Results,” Bartlesmann Stiftung, accessed November 29, 2018, https://atlas.bti-
project.org/share.php?1*2018*CV:CTC:SELBRA*CAT*BRA*REG:TAB. 
267 “Brazil Country Report,” Bartlesmann Stiftung, 3, accessed November 1, 2018, https://www.bti-
project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/BRA/. 
268 Bartlesmann Stiftung, 3. 
269 Power and Taylor, “Introduction,” 4.  
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Accountability,” in Corruption and Democracy in Brazil, ed. Timothy J. Power and Matthew M. Taylor 
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each of the accused would have to stand trial in the STF.”272 What is unusual about the 
case is that the STF “broke all expectations by harshly condemning powerful and well 
connected politicians … [creating] a watershed in the Supreme Court’s history.”273  
“The trial of the century” is only half of the story of Brazil’s judicial 
transformation.274 The other half comes from the ruling of constitutionality of the Law of 
Clean Slate or Lei da Ficha Limpa. Prompted by the overwhelming corruption present in 
the Brazilian government system, citizens requested a law to prohibit “anyone from 
running for political office for eight years if convicted of certain crimes, which include a 
host of financial crimes, drug trafficking, and assorted forms of corruption.”275 On 
February 16, 2012, the STF via ADI 4578, declared itself in favor of the Law of Clean 
Slate, thereby legitimizing it.276 
Since “a decision made in an ADI extend[s] to all of society,” its ramifications 
factored in criminal cases like Mensalão.277 Even though the STF is “institutionally ill-
equipped to serve as a trial court,” it is responsible for adjudicating criminal cases of 
high-ranking politician through privileged forum.278 Privileged forums “entitles 
[politicians and cabinet members] to hearings by the Supreme Court [versus common 
courts], a much slower procedure by what some perceive as a more politically-motivated 
court.”279 Upholding the Law of Clean Slate grants the STF the power to remove 
political members in an effort to limit governmental corruption.  
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Stemming from the aforementioned judicial transformation, the STF “has 
demonstrated a much greater institutional capacity to gather evidence, implicate 
defendants and prosecute them while also recouping millions of dollars lost in vast 
money laundering schemes.”280 The organization is able to replicate and expand its 
success on new political controversies, like Lava Jato and Odebrecht.281 
C. CONSEQUENCES 
Defining success in judicial terms is problematic. Lawyers are typically credited 
with the advancement of liberal democratic doctrine, but they have also made mistakes. 
Heralded in their day, various monumental decisions by national courts were far from 
helpful and useful for society. Lest we forget, “successful courts” in a democratic United 
States legitimized slavery, segregation, and the use of internment camps. In light of past 
national court failures, objective critical analysis proves advantageous when dealing with 
landmark cases and the overall assessment of democratic standing. Likewise, it is crucial to 
understand that the “current state [of Democracy] is that of regression” stemming from “a 
growing [popular] dissatisfaction from the existing establishments.”282 Subjective thought 
on behalf of some citizens may lead them to believe institutions within their country are 
frustrating yet highly democratic, however the objective measurement by the BTI indicates 
that Brazil is an advanced but defective democracy.283  
Judicial interpretation in landmark cases disturb the overall constitutional reality of 
democracies. For Brazil, the consequences of accepting the constitutionality of ADI 4578 
                                                 
280 Kelsey L. Finley, “Corruption in Brazil and the Incentives for Change” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2017), 1, cited from Sergio Praça and Matthew M. Taylor, “Inching Toward 
Accountability: The Evolution of Brazil’s Anticorruption Institutions, 1985–2010,” Latin America Politics 
and Society 56, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 27–48, https://doi.org.10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00230.x. 
281 Lava Jato is an investigation of corruption by a state-owned company, Petrobras. The company is 
accused of accepting bribes from firms for government contracts. One of the firms is Odebrecht that has 
been linked with bribery operations in 12 countries. Claire Felter and Rocio Cara, “Brazil’s Corruption 
Fallout,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils-corruption-fallout, 
updated November 7, 2018. 
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Perceptions,” Revistă de Cercetar Ştiinţifică Pluridisciplinară ix, no. 3 (September 2017): 41.  




have affected four of the five “interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions” of a 
consolidated democracy: civil society, political society, rule of law, and usable state 
bureaucracy.284 
In the case of Brazil, judicialization of political cases of corruption has had a high 
impact on the civil society arena. The BTI grants Brazilian civil society participation a score 
of 7.285 In this connection, the decision of the STF to adjudicate ADI 4578 is a clear 
example of national courts understanding and upholding the power of the demos. The Law 
of Clean Slate originated when the “Movement to Combat Electoral Corruption–a group 
representing more than 40 civil society organization, non-profits, and religious associations–
collected over 3 mission signatures to submit a bill before Congress,” which later passed 
into law.286 The new petition-to-law legislation, one of only four since 1988, had immediate 
repercussions on other democratic arenas, particularly on the political realm, the source of 
public discontent.287 The capacity of the Brazilian population to “generate political 
alternatives and to monitor government and state” via new and upheld norms supports a 
stronger assessment of democracy.288  
Judicialization in Brazil has had a medium impact on the political society arena. 
Brazilian political and social integration received a score of 6 in the BTI.289 For Brazil’s 
Law of Clean Slate, the population (civil society) and Congress (state) worked together to 
structure the political system in a way that supported the requests of society for a less 
corrupt government and simultaneously ensured continued support for governmental order. 
This is not to say that the population is content abiding by mandatory voting laws only to 
settle with the current state of affairs, far from it. In a recent poll, 78% of Brazilians 
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perceived that the level of corruption was on the rise and that the most corrupt were the 
police, elected representatives, and local government.290 Brazilians recognize the need for a 
state to exist, but question the overall benefits of a democracy, particularly if it is ineffective 
in providing “security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental 
surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and 
fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities−to 
their citizens.”291 A 2017 Pew Research study found that only 21% of the population was 
committed to representative democracy and 62% of those polled were willing to consider 
less or nondemocratic options.292 “In general, public commitment to representative 
democracy is highest in countries that have a well-functioning democracy,” so the Brazilian 
deviation suggests discontent with the overall governmental system. Brazil is not alone, 
satisfaction with democracy “is least common in Latin America” versus other areas.293  
For Brazil, judicialization has had a high impact on the rule of law arena, based on 
the 7.8 value of the BTI. To begin with, dealing with Mensalão has enabled the STF to 
“guarantee procedural justice and ex post enforcement, independent of partisan power 
dynamics,” brining the theoretic aspect of rule of law closer with reality.294 The ADI 4578 
decision that required politicians to be free from criminal proceeding or claims of corruption 
before running for governmental positions, developed out the public’s need for more robust 
accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, the ADI case led to the creation and passage of a 
new amendment to the constitution.295 Such actions “suggest that Brazil has crossed a 
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political threshold of sorts, and the country’s political landscape is clearly experiencing a 
critical moment of institutional fluidity.”296  
“Constitutions must meet changing [polity] needs … .judicially,” and the drive for 
institutional deviation is driven by inefficiencies in the overall government.297 With regard 
to the state bureaucracy arena, judicialization has enabled a medium improvement of 
Brazil’s governmental steering capacity. The BTI scores the steering capacity of the state at 
a 6.3. Prior to Mensalão and ADI 4578, Brazilian bureaucracy consistently produced 
intangible results in corruption investigations.298 Mensalão created usable bureaucracy by 
enabling Congress to investigate and later confirm the existence of the scheme, culminating 
in a recommendation to indict on a federal level.299 Though there was considerable 
pushback, the process to bring justice to a once lawless governmental arena, signifies the 
cooperation and coordination of multiple governmental entities. Table 3 shows the 
theoretical framework created for Brazil. “Above all, the Mensalão shows the capacity of 
Brazil’s legal system to remain independent in spite of political dynamics that 
overwhelmingly appeared to favor immunity.”300 The case also “seemed to stoke a flurry of 
accountability-enhancing initiatives inside and outside government.”301 The Lei da Ficha 
Limpa was an initiative that supported players in an old, yet newly revamped bureaucratic 
environment.  
Table 3. Theoretical Framework for Brazil 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 











Constitutional Politics H M H M A 
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Overall, the theory of constitutional politics adequately explains judicialization in 
Brazil versus other judicial empowerment theories. This is because democratic arenas of 
civil society and rule of law play a major role in the theory. The remaining arenas, 
political society and usable bureaucracy, factor minimally in incentivizing 
constitutionalization. Constitutional politics theory in Brazil is supported by the antipathy 
of the polity and political elites. While political elites enjoyed what was considered 
institutionalized political immunity, citizens could not fathom why crimes did not apply 
to government representatives. Accepting and adjudicating politicized cases enabled the 
STF to prevent the collapse of the state. The democratic transformation in Brazil is partly 
attributed to a state that makes room for the positive integration of civil society and the 
rule of law via judicialization. Of concern, are the medium ratings of both political 
society and usable state bureaucracy. Although the two residual arenas improved with the 
ruling of the landmark case, both are the areas that prevent Brazil from achieving a more 
robust democratic status. 
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IV. CASE STUDY OF JUDICIALIZATION: URUGUAY 
This chapter provides an overview of judicial power in Uruguay. The section 
describes the power relationship of the judicial branch and the national court. 
Additionally, the section covers court statistics over a 20-year period and corroborates the 
existence of the judicialization phenomenon in Uruguay. The analysis of a controversial 
case allows extrapolation of changes affecting the current democratic standing of the 
country. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL POWER 
The Oriental Republic of Uruguay is a constitutional republic302 that has three 
branches of government.303 The executive branch is comprised of an elected president 
who is both the head of state and head of government and fulfills a term of five years304 
Uruguay has a bicameral legislature, which governs via a General Assembly made-up of 
a 31-member Senate305 and a 99-member House of Representatives.306 Uruguay has a 
five-court civil law-based legal system,307 that is responsible for “issuing and enforcing 
judicial rulings, guaranteeing the exercise and protection of individual rights as set out in 
the law, and preserving the peace in the framework of the Rule of Law.”308 The judicial 
                                                 
302 A Constitutional republic is “a government by or operating under an authoritative document 
(constitution) that sets forth the system of fundamental laws and principles that determines the nature, 
functions, and limits of that government.” The CIA Factbook defines a republic as “a representative 
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legislation.” CIA, “The World Factbook, Field Listing: Government Type.”  
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system is made up of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ), the Courts of Appeal, District 
Courts, Peace Courts, and Rural Courts.”309 The Courts of Appeal are second instance 
courts dedicated to contend with civil, family, labor, and criminal disputes in which 
appeals have been made after first instance sentencing by District Courts.310 District, 
Peace, and Rural Courts are jurisdictional organizations that provide first instance 
sentencing by an individual judge.311 The SCJ constitutes the apex court in Uruguay and 
as such, “has national authority…there are no autonomous judicial institutions within 
each department or city.”312 Since Uruguay follows a civil law legal system, cases are 
judged individually and the final outcome is not considered a blanket determination for 
additional cases. 
The SCJ is composed of five justices, who have the following qualifications: “1. 
Forty years or over; 2. Native citizenship in exercise of the rights thereof, or legal 
citizenship with ten years exercise thereof and twenty-five years of residency in the 
country; 3 ... [and] have been a lawyer for ten years, or as such to have been a member of 
the Judiciary of the Public or Fiscal Ministry for a period of eight years.”313 SCJ justices 
are appointed by the General Assembly with a two-thirds majority,314 and must serve 10-
year terms;315 the age limit is set at 70 years.316 Judges interpret the national constitution 
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310 International Business Publications, 38. 
311 A breakdown of each individual court and subsequent lower courts is provided in pages 37–40. 
International Business Publications, 38. 
312 International Business Publications, 37; “Uruguay: Description of the Judicial System of 
Uruguay,” Florida International University, Steven J. Green School of Interntional & Public Affairs, 
October 16, 2018, https://caj.fiu.edu/national-cj-systems/south-america/uruguay/. 
313 Article 234 (# of justices) and 235 (eligibility). “The Constitution of Uruguay 1966 (reinst. 1985, 
rev. 2004),” Constitutute Project, 2012, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Uruguay_2004?lang=en. English translation by William S. Heing & Co., Inc. 
314 International Business Publications, Uruguay Business Law Handbook Strategic Information and 
Basic Laws, 38. 
315 Article 237 (term). Constitutute Project, “The Constitution of Uruguay 1966 (reinst. 1985, rev. 
2004).”  
316 Article 250 (70 years old). Constitutute Project. 
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of 1996, which was reinstated in 1985, and counts with four subsequent amendments, the 
most recent in 2004.317  
Based on Uruguay’s national judicial statistics report, the caseload initiated by the 
SCJ increased from 637 in 1999318 to 2,487 in 2017.319 Out of the SCJ docket, 2,653 
cases were decided strictly on unconstitutionality terms.320 The total number of judicial 
review cases decided by the SCJ rose from 23 in 1999 to 120 in 2017 signaling a slight, 
but noteworthy correlation between the total number of cases seen by the SCJ, and those 
that deal with judicial review. As seen in Figure 9, SCJ statistics also outline the 
unprecedented willingness of Uruguayan judges to accept cases and thus become 
involved in the modern political issues of the country. 
                                                 
317 Comparative Constitutions Project, “Timeline of Constitutions,” citing Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions.  
318 Departamento de Estadísticas, Evolución de los asuntos iniciados según competencia de la sede y 
área geográfica, anuario estadístico año 2010 [Evolution of matters initiated according to the competence 
of the headquarters and geographical area, statistical yearbook year 2010] (Montevideo: Departamento de 
Estadísticas, 2011). 
319 Poder Judicial Uruguay, “Anuario estadístico 2017—Gráfico 4. Evolución de los asuntos iniciados 
por la Suprema Corte de Justicia. Periodo 2007–2017 [Statistical yearbook 2017—Chart 4. Evolution of the 
matters initiated by the Supreme Court of Justice. Period 2007–2017],” 34, accessed October 15, 2018, 
http://poderjudicial.gub.uy/anuario-estadistico. 




Figure 9. Uruguay SCJ Docket321 
B. CASES AFFECTING DEMOCRACY 
According to 2018 BTI statistics, Uruguay holds the top honor worldwide for 
democratic standing boasting a highly advanced and consolidated democracy.322 The 
country also has “the longest democratic history in Latin America” and receives high 
                                                 
321 Adapted from Departamento de Estadísticas, Evolución de los asuntos iniciados [Evolution of 
matters initiated]; “Base de Jurisprudencia Nacional,” Poder Judicial República Oriental del Uruguay, 
accessed October 18, 2018, http://bjn.poderjudicial.gub.uy/BJNPUBLICA/busquedaSimple.seam. 
Selectively searched database for statistics on the total of definitive rulings of inconstitutionality in SCJ 
from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2017. 




praise for sustained democratic norms.323 However, the rating stands in stark contrast 
with the country’s handling of human rights violations committed during the dictatorship 
period (1973–1985).324 Post dictatorship, the Ley de Caducidad,325 or the Expiry of the 
Punitive Claims of the State, required the state to “renounce its right to prosecute 
members of the military and police with respect to crimes committed until 1 March 
1985.”326 In opposition to the law, the population, non-governmental organizations, and 
political sectors, organized two unsuccessful referendums in 1986 and 1989.327 
Additionally, the SJC had ruled the law constitutional in 1988 under grounds of an 
authentic amnesty law by the executive.328 Thus, “Uruguay is…the only country in the 
world that has not once but twice democratically approved an amnesty law designed to 
shield the military from criminal prosecution for violations.”329 The adoption of such 
unorthodox measure was justified as a requirement to complete Uruguay’s transition 
from dictatorship rule to full constitutional order. Via the amnesty law, the new post-
transition government avoided military resistance and the threat of regression.330  
                                                 
323 “Uruguay Country Report,” Bartlesmann Stiftung, accessed November 29, 2018, https://www.bti-
project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/URY/. 
324 Peter J. Meyer, Uruguay: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. 
R40909 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 4.  
325 Also known as Ley No. 15.848 or Expiry Law. The law was approved in Montevideo in 1986. 
“Republica Oriental del Uruguay [Eastern Republic of Uruguay],” Poder Legislativo, accessed November 
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Macmillan: 2011), 136. 
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un modelo para el castigo de los crímenes pasados a través de la experiencia iberoamericana Derecho 
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pasados a través de la experiencia iberoamericana [International law and transitions to democracy and 
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(Madrid: Ediciones Parthenon, 2007), 398; Case “Detta, Josefina; Menotti, Noris; Martinez, Federico; 
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1, 2, 3, y 4,” Judgement no. 112/87, Resolution of May 2, 1988, 2256–2318.  
329 Skaar, Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Latin America, 136. 
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One positive aspect of the amnesty law was that it allowed the free-flow of 
information in investigations regarding disappearances and abuses. Peace commissions 
provided a limited level of closure to grieving families, as they would only investigate 
and produce information on each case, and at the same time, clear the guilty. As Victor 
Semproni, a political actor in Uruguay proposed, once the military agreed to reveal 
information about the case, “the issue would be closed forever.”331 On the other hand, 
the inability to prosecute those responsible for the crimes legally, caused friction 
domestically. The law requires cooperation between the judicial and executive branches 
before a human rights case that transpired during the dictatorship, can be heard 
nationally.332 At various times, such cases were accepted by the judicial branch, but did 
not proceed to adjudication because it failed to garner the president’s approval.333 
The fact that a national impunity policy was ruled constitutional, twice upheld via 
referendum, and vigorously supported by various presidents, including a former 
Tupamaro, has not deterred a number of family members and practices from seeking 
justice via national courts. Since the adoption of the Ley de Caducidad, the slow but 
constant trickle of human rights abuse cases has continued to challenge the norm and 
push the judicial branch to consider further determinations of unconstitutionality. For 
example, in one such case in 2009, the SCJ delivered a ruling of unconstitutionality of the 
Ley de Caducidad, citing discrepancies in its adoption and declaring that 3 of the 16 
articles ran counter to the constitution.334 This ruling was monumental, because it found 
fault in a previously addressed law deemed constitutional by the SCJ itself. According to 
the members that formed the SCJ in 2009, the law was in breach of constitutional 
                                                 
331 Skaar, 154. 
332 Daniel Soltman, “Applauding Uruguay’s Quest for Justice: Dictatorship, Amnesty, and Repeal of 
Uruguay Law No. 15.848,” Washington Uiversity Global Studies Law Review 12, no. 4 (2013): 831, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss4/9/. 
333 Bartlesmann Stiftung, “Uruguay Country Report.” 
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American Experiences, ed. José Maria Beneyto and David Kennedy (Netherlands: T. M. C. Asser Press, 
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procedures and it endangered the independence of all governmental branches.335 
Furthermore, the landmark case provided an opening for unconstitutional rulings for 20 
additional cases and the court acceptance of 140 archived cases.  
In contrast to judicial progress regarding human rights abuses, a national 
plebiscite that same year upheld the continuation of the impunity law with a 52% pro and 
48% against.336 The narrow decision reflects the division of not only popular opinion but 
political opinion as well. The failed plebiscite and domestic and international pressure 
finally drove the push for a new avenue to address the issue via the legislative branch. In 
2011, after many governmental missteps, law 18.831 was passed that reinstated the 
ability of the state to punish human rights abusers during the dictatorship.337 Two years 
later, the SCJ became the center of attention once again when they delivered a 
determination of unconstitutionality of law 18.831 citing that the legislative power does 
not have the ability to abolish a law elected and confirmed by the population.338 
Judicial transformation in Uruguay in regards to human rights abuse is thought 
provoking. The composition of the national court has allowed more of these cases to be 
seen, but delivered divergent jurisprudence.339 The outcomes of individual cases have 
institutionalized discrepancies and contradictions that have polarizing effects on the 
public and political opinions of an already polemic, politically sanctioned measure.340  
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Once again, defining judicial success proves problematic, as upholding liberal 
democratic standards may not always yield conventional results when dealing with 
human rights issues. The Uruguayan government upholds the democratic standing of the 
government via its elected laws and boldly recognizes the will of the people as 
represented via referendums. Essentially, the SCJ advocates for the constitutional rights 
of its citizens, while also guaranteeing legal protection of those implicated in abusing the 
rights of the same.  
As was the case in Brazil, judicial interpretation of landmark cases has disturbed 
the constitutional reality of Uruguay. The consequences of upholding law 15.848 and 
rejecting the constitutionality of law 18.831 has affected four of the five consolidated 
democracy arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, and usable bureaucracy. 
Judicialization has had a high impact on the country’s civil society arena, 
corroborated by the BTI civil society participation score of 10. Indeed, Uruguay’s 
constitution outlines the exercise of sovereignty directly by initiative and referendum and 
indirectly by representative powers.341 Therefore, the government allows for the active 
participation of civil society. In the 1980s, a weak human rights movement could not 
adequately counter the political power behind the amnesty law, nor muster enough 
support during the country’s first referendum.342 By 2007, civil society had amassed 
enough political support to launch an initiative for annulment of the amnesty law and a 
call for a referendum.343 Referendum results have not been positive for human rights 
activists, yet increased strength behind Uruguay’s civil society is one of the reasons for 
judicialization though at a slow and measured pace. As citizens “become more active in 
presenting cases to the courts, … judges too have become activists in the way they rule in 
rights matters.”344 
                                                 
341 Jorge Diaz Almeida, Fiscalia General de la Nacion, 2.  
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The political society arena has also been highly impacted by adjudicating law 
18.831. The BTI assesses political and social integration in Uruguay with a value of 9.8. 
As such, Uruguayans have learned from past political experiences and adjusted their 
voting behavior to address current needs.345 Though voting is compulsory in Uruguay, 
electoral volatility has been recorded at below 5% in 2014.346 A robust political society 
exists in Uruguay, but “political elite may still be able to leverage governance capital 
accumulated … [and] anchored in institutions.”347  
The assessment of the rule of law proved challenging in the case of Uruguay 
because of the unique relationship and responsibility between the judiciary and executive 
branches. Though the Uruguayan judicial branch has a perfect score (10) by BTI 
standards, it is important to revisit the requirement of the amnesty law to refer to the 
executive for judicial matters dealing with human rights abuse.348 In doing so, “the 
executive controls the courts and takes on an anti-prosecution stance, [making] the 
likelihood of trials…slim.”349 The specific cases where judicial independence is not 
guaranteed, affects the efficiency in rule of law and translates to lower quality of 
democracy for Uruguayans, hence the need for a deviation from BTI statistics. In this 
context, the Uruguay earns a low score for the rule of law arena. 
Judicialization of human rights abuse cases has had a high impact on the usable 
state bureaucracy arena. The BTI scores the state’s steering capacity as 8.3.350 To 
validate this fact, the SCJ has processed and upheld 31 laws as unconstitutional.351 
Democratic institutions, like the judicial system, are stable, efficient, and garner the 
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support and trust of the population.352 The SCJ promotes justice in almost all spheres 
except human rights abuses, as it is bound by previous constitutionality decisions.353 
However, bureaucracy has been effective, particularly through the election of a president 
in 2004 who exempted 47 cases from the amnesty law providing avenues toward 
prosecution.354 See Table 4 for the theoretical framework created for Uruguay. The 
combination of SJC rulings and current executive representatives with a motivation to 
pursue retributive justice enables the processing of an additional 600 cases. For this 
reason, Uruguay’s usable state bureaucracy can be labeled as high. 
Table 4. Theoretical Framework for Uruguay 
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Arenas of a Consolidated Democracy 








Microlevel, Rational Choice H H L H A 
 
Overall judicialization in Uruguay supports the theory of microlevel rational 
choice versus other judicial empowerment theories. This is due to the existence of three 
robust democratic arenas, civil society, political society and usable state bureaucracy, 
which contrast with the minimal consideration for the rule of law. Only when actors, 
mostly the executive and legislative branches, can further their political standing will the 
judicial branch be allowed the opportunity to prosecute human rights abuse cases. The 
democratic transformation in Uruguay is partly attributed to a democracy that may be 
limited by a deficiency in the rule of law. Although the low standing of the rule of law 
applies to a limited number of cases, it signals a potential area of concern if the same 
behavior extends to a growing SCJ docket.  
                                                 
352 “The 2015 Report of the Latinobarómetro Corporation shows that 51% of citizens trust the justice 
system and 52% evaluate the work of the judicial branch positively.” Bartlesmann Stiftung, 10–11. 
353 Bartlesmann Stiftung, 11. 
354 Skaar, “Uruguay: From Impunity to Trials,” 179. 
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V. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis considered five possible theories to explain judicial empowerment via 
constitutionalization. It assessed the democratic standing of Brazil and Uruguay while 
taking notice of particular changes that have occurred in four arenas of a consolidated or 
consolidating democracy after landmark cases were adjudicated at the national level.  
A. ANALYSIS 
Results indicate that judicialization in Brazil and Uruguay is caused by two 
distinct reasons, as seen in Table 5. Brazil’s STF is affected by constitutional politics and 
Uruguay’s SCJ contends with characteristics of micro-level rational choice. Since the 
incentives to empower the judicial branch are different, they prioritize or disregard 
unique arenas of democratic consolidation. 
Table 5. Case Study Results 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 











BRAZIL: Constitutional Politics H M H M A 
URUGUAY: Microlevel, Rational 
Choice 
H H L H A 
 
In both cases, judicialization bolstered civil society. Through the adjudication of 
contentious issues, national courts in for Brazil and Uruguay provided an avenue for 
popular action to thrive. Whether the results were favorable or not, does not retract from 
the court’s support for enhanced civil participation. The judicialization outcome could be 
caused by the overall governmental and judicial structure that allows the demos to 
challenge entrenched values. 
Results for the political society arena vary by one degree because the realities of 
each country are different. In the Brazilian case, judicialization assisted a once 
disorganized political society to coalesce and push for needed anti-corruption measures in 
government. In short, a stronger national court encouraged increased Brazilian political 
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participation. Uruguay’s high political society remained intact after judicialization 
because the court justified its actions as a continuation of routinized, legally binding 
political decisions.  
The effects of judicialization on the rule of law in Brazil and Uruguay are two 
degrees apart. In Brazil, judicial empowerment arose only after citizens demanded the 
overhaul of both the legislative and executive branches. For Uruguay, judicialization 
impaired the rule of law in the country as both court outcomes promoted continued 
restriction of the judicial branch by the executive. 
The comparison of each country’s usable state bureaucracy yields a one-degree 
difference. In Brazil, the landmark Mensalão case enabled the creation of system that 
promotes tangible and repeatable results in corruption cases. Judicialization in Uruguay 
resulted in positive changes for the state bureaucracy. Though limited by decisions of the 
executive branch, the existing state bureaucracy has allowed an increase in exceptions of 
amnesty law cases.  
The case studies indicate that judicialization in Brazil has yielded better results on 
the arenas of democratic consolidation than that of Uruguay. Since the effects of an 
empowered Brazilian judicial branch relate with constitutional politics theory, it means 
that civil society has a distinguished place in politics and that respect for the rule of law 
works to benefit all members of the polity. Uruguay’s juxtaposition regarding 
judicialization signals a decline in one arena of democratic consolidation, the rule of law. 
The decline can explained by microlevel rational choice theory, which highlights the 
interest-relationship of power holders and the judicial branch.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The case studies confirm the link between empowered judicial courts and the 
growth of judicialization cases in the Americas. The adjudication of controversial cases 
in Brazil and Uruguay reveals positive and negative effects in four of the five arenas of 
consolidating and consolidated democracies. The handling of Brazil’s corruption cases 
signals positive state growth, while Uruguay’s judicialization of human rights cases cast a 
shadow on the strength and independence of the judicial branch. 
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This thesis provided quantitative data regarding claims of judicialization and the 
reasons for judicial empowerment. In doing so, the case studies produced distinct results 
affecting arenas of consolidated democracies. The outcome highlights divergent results in 
the enhancement or atrophy of democratic norms in the Americas, in particular Brazil and 
Uruguay. In the case of Brazil, judicialization as a product of peripheral groups checking 
the political power of policymakers, formed positive changes that strengthened 
democracy. What is worrisome, is that judicialization in Uruguay is driven by the 
interests of political power holders. Circumstances must prove beneficial for Uruguayan 
power holders before allowing institutional changes that strengthen democracy within the 
country.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Understanding the core purpose behind judicial empowerment should be a top 
priority for policy makers and the judiciary. When judicialization occurs, it is useful to 
keep in mind the implications behind each theory. No theory exists that yields high 
results across all arenas of democratization, so the expectation of judicialization without 
effecting democratic standing is null. Political stakeholders across the globe must 
recognize that the judicialization trend anticipates a likely transformation of democracy 
with each case seen.  
Though research for this study was limited to only two countries, it is possible 
that additional data matches current or new theories of judicial empowerment. A more 
thorough study with a wider scope including additional American countries, multiple 
judicial review cases, and a longer time period, would verify that the theoretical 
framework is successful at identifying patters of democratic change.  
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